Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority under Cyberbulling Laws by Suski, Emily
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
Fall 2014 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of 
School Surveillance Authority under Cyberbulling Laws 
Emily Suski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and 
the Fourth Amendment Commons 
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 65 | Issue 1
2014
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The
Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance
Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws
Emily F. Suski
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority Under Cyberbullying Laws, 65
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 63 (2014)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol65/iss1/9
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
63 
 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: 
The Unprecedented Expansion of 
School Surveillance Authority 
Under Cyberbullying Laws 
Emily F. Suski† 
Abstract 
For several years, states have grappled with the problem of 
cyberbullying and its sometimes devastating effects. Because 
cyberbullying often occurs between students, most states have 
understandably looked to schools to help address the problem. To 
that end, schools in forty-six states have the authority to intervene 
when students engage in cyberbullying. This solution seems all to the 
good unless a close examination of the cyberbullying laws and their 
implications is made. This Article explores some of the problematic 
implications of the cyberbullying laws. More specifically, it focuses on 
how the cyberbullying laws allow schools unprecedented surveillance 
authority over students. This authority stands in notably stark 
contrast to the constraints on government authority in other contexts, 
including police authority to search cell phones. In June 2014, the 
Supreme Court recognized in Riley v. California that police searches 
of cell phones require a warrant because of the particular intrusions 
into privacy attendant to those searches. While some surveillance 
authority over students may be warranted, the majority of the 
cyberbullying laws implicitly give schools unlimited, or nearly 
unlimited, and unfettered surveillance authority over students’ online 
and electronic activity whenever, wherever, and however it occurs: at 
home, in bedrooms, at the mall, on personal cell phones, on tablets, or 
on laptops.  
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Weber. I am also grateful to the participants of the University of 
Kentucky College of Law Developing Ideas Conference and the 
Association of American Law Schools Conference on Clinical Legal 
Education Works in Progress session for feedback on earlier versions of 
this Article. Finally, I owe thanks to John Sharpe for outstanding 
research assistance.  
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This Article argues that the cyberbullying laws, though well 
meaning, vastly expand school authority through the broad, if 
implicit, allowance of surveillance authority over students and 
implicate privacy harms that are made more acute because the 
authority lies with schools over students. Although no doctrine yet 
exists on the limits of school surveillance authority, limits on school 
authority in other contexts do exist. First and Fourth Amendment 
doctrine in student-speech and search cases, as well as doctrine on 
government surveillance more generally, offers some guidance on 
where the boundaries of school authority lie. The surveillance 
authority in most cyberbullying laws goes beyond these bounds, 
indicating that cyberbullying laws expand school authority. To 
protect students from excessive school surveillance authority and 
attendant privacy harms, realistic limits need to be imposed on school 
surveillance authority under the cyberbullying laws both by way of a 
framework for determining the boundaries of school authority and a 
cause of action for students. This Article calls for both and draws on 
the nexus doctrine in First Amendment student-speech cases to 
develop such a framework. 
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 Introduction 
Although much attention has deservedly been paid to the problem 
of cyberbullying, little attention has been paid to some of the far-
reaching implications of the anti-cyberbullying laws that collectively 
represent the response to the problem. This Article explores some of 
the unexamined and troubling aspects of the cyberbullying laws. 
Cyberbullying laws, mostly passed as part of states’ education codes, 
prohibit cyberbullying, or bullying by electronic means, and provide 
schools with the authority to discipline students for it.1 California 
 
1. Ala. Code § 16-28B (2012); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-341 (2012); 
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-514 (2009); Cal. Educ. Code § 48900(r) 
(West Supp. 2014); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32-109.1 (2012); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-222d (Supp. 2014); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D (Supp. 2012); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1006.147 (West Supp. 2014); 
Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); Haw. Code R. § 8-19-2 
(LexisNexis 2014); 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27-23.7 (West 2012); 
Ind. Code Ann. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West Supp. 2014); Iowa Code 
§ 280.28. (2011); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-8256 (Supp. 2013); La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 17:416.13 (Supp. 2014); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.7 
(Supp. 2014); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (Supp. 2013); Md. 
Code Ann., Educ. § 7-424 (LexisNexis 2012); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 71, § 37O (West Supp. 2014); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 380.1310b 
(West 2013); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 121A.0695 (West 2008); Miss. Code 
Ann. § 37-11-67 (Supp. 2013); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 160.775 (2010); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. § 79-2,137 (Supp. 2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 388.135, 
388.1351 (Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F (2011); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:37-14 (West 2013); N.M. Code R. § 6.12.7.7 
(LexisNexis 2014); N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 11–12 (McKinney Supp. 2014); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-407.15 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-19-17 
to -18 (Supp. 2013); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.666 (LexisNexis 
2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, §§ 24-100.2 to 24-100.5 (Supp. 2013); Or. 
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enacted one of the first such laws in 2008,2 and forty-six states and 
the District of Columbia now have laws prohibiting cyberbullying.3  
The laws are a response to both the increased attention to the 
problem of cyberbullying over the last several years and calls-to-
action to address it.4 These calls have been made for good reason; 
cyberbullying is a prevalent, sometimes tragic, problem.5 According to 
 
Rev. Stat. §§ 339.351, 339.356 (2011); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 13-
1303.1-A (West Supp. 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 16-21-33 to 16-21-34 
(Supp. 2013); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 59-63-120 to 59-63-150 (Supp. 2013); 
S.D. Codified Laws §§ 13-32-14 to 13-32-14 (Supp. 2013); Tenn. 
Code Ann. §§ 49-6-4502 to 49-6-4503 (2013); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. 
§ 37.0832 (West 2014); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11a (LexisNexis Supp. 
2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, §§ 11, 570 (Supp. 2013); Va. Code 
Ann. §§ 22.1-276.01, 22.1-291.4 (Supp. 2014); Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 28A.300.285 (2012); W. Va. Code Ann. § 18-2C (LexisNexis 2012); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4-312 to 21-4-312 (2011). The District of 
Columbia also has a law prohibiting bullying, but it is not contained in 
its education code. Instead it is part of its government affairs statutes. 
Nonetheless, the statute requires schools to adopt the definition of 
bullying, including cyberbullying. D.C. Code §§ 2-1535.01 to 2-1535.09. 
As another example, Idaho’s bullying statute is part of its penal code, 
though it only refers to “student” actions. Idaho Code Ann. § 18-917A 
(2006). 
2. Jeremy Thomas & Katy Murphy, Cyberbullying: Parents, School 
Officials Both Search for Answers, San Jose Mercury News, May 2, 
2013, http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_23158922/cyberbullying-parents 
-school-officials-both-search-answers.  
3. Alaska, Kentucky, and Wisconsin do not include bullying by electronic 
means or any other definition of cyberbullying in their bullying laws. 
Alaska Stat. § 14.33.200 (2012); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.070 
(West 2006); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 118.46 (West Supp. 2013). Montana 
does not have a bullying law of any sort.  
4. Scholars, journalists, and nonprofit groups, among others, have all called 
for action to address the problem. E.g., Naomi H. Goodno, How Public 
Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying 
Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth 
Amendment Challenges, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 641 (2011) 
(advocating for a policy likely to survive a constitutional challenge); 
Kelly A. Albin, Bullies in a Wired World: The Impact of Cyberspace 
Victimization on Adolescent Mental Health and the Need for 
Cyberbullying Legislation in Ohio, 25 J.L. & Health 155 (2012) 
(describing harms caused by cyberbullying and proposes legislation to 
address it); Our Mission, STOMP Out Bullying, http://www. 
stompoutbullying.org/index.php/about/mission/ (last visited June 24, 
2014); (explaining mission to prevent bullying and cyberbullying, which 
sometimes leads victims to commit suicide) Pacer Center’s National 
Bullying Prevention Center, http://www.pacer.org/bullying/ 
nbpm/ (last visited June 24, 2014) (suggesting ways in which students, 
parents, and educators can take steps to raise bullying awareness). 
5. See generally Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s Suicide Points to Rise in Apps 
Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2013 (describing how a 
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one study of twelve-to-seventeen-year-olds, 72 percent of Internet 
users reported at least one instance of bullying in the immediate prior 
year.6 Of those in the study, 51 percent reported experiencing online 
bullying by other students in their school.7 Given that this study was 
conducted in 2008, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
cyberbullying problem has not decreased with the increasing ubiquity 
of technology in the last few years, including new apps for texting and 
otherwise engaging through social media, some of which even provide 
for anonymous posting.8 
Cyberbullying is not only a widespread problem but also one that 
can also have devastating effects. Rebecca Ann Sedwick serves as just 
one of many tragic examples of the effects of cyberbullying.9 Rebecca 
was a twelve-year-old Florida girl who committed suicide in 
September 2013 by jumping off a platform at an abandoned cement 
plant after enduring more than a year of bullying by text message and 
over the Internet.10  
By prohibiting cyberbullying among students, the cyberbullying 
laws are undoubtedly aimed at preventing more cases like Rebecca’s 
and curbing the incidences of cyberbullying more generally. In intent, 
then, the laws heed the calls-to-action that have served as the 
catalyst for their enactment. Yet the manner in which the laws 
address the problem of cyberbullying creates its own set of problems. 
In a majority of states, they arguably provide schools with unlimited 
or nearly unlimited authority to conduct electronic surveillance of 
students’ online and electronic activity whenever and wherever that 
activity occurs.  
How do the cyberbullying laws provide schools with surveillance 
authority? By allowing schools the authority to discipline students for 
cyberbullying, they implicitly provide schools with the authority to 
ferret out the problem.11 To determine whether and when students are 
engaged in cyberbullying, the schools have a few options, but among 
 
twelve-year-old Florida girl committed suicide after being bullied on 
various texting and photo-sharing apps).  
6. Jaana Juvonen & Elisheva F. Gross, Extending the School Grounds? 
Bullying Experiences in Cyberspace, 78 J. Sch. Health 496, 502 
(2009). The definitions of bullying in most bullying laws—twenty-
eight—prohibit bullying that occurs as one-time acts. See infra note 26 
and accompanying text. 
7. Id. at 501–02. 
8. Michael H. King, Could the App Yik Yak Be a Cyberbullying Tool? 
(Feb. 22, 2014, 12:33 AM), http://roswell.11alive.com/news/education/ 
608482-could-app-yik-yak-be-cyberbullying-tool.  
9. Alvarez, supra note 5, at A1.  
10. Id.  
11. See infra Part I.A.  
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the most effective and efficient means is developing a system for 
comprehensively monitoring students’ online and electronic activity.12 
Because cyberbullying laws do not prohibit this surveillance, they 
arguably allow schools to reach into students’ lives while they are at 
home, work, the mall or other non-school places and gather electronic 
data on the students in the name of learning about cyberbullying 
activity. The laws expand the proverbial schoolhouse gates to such a 
degree that, in many cases, schools’ authority to conduct surveillance 
of students is nearly without bounds.13  
Some schools are beginning to grab this implicit power under the 
cyberbullying laws to conduct just this level of surveillance. While the 
exercise of this implicit authority is new, at least a few schools and 
school districts have now hired (at no small expense) companies to 
comprehensively monitor the online and electronic activity of all their 
students at all locations and times. For example, in July 2014, 
Jackson County School District in North Carolina announced that it 
is paying a private company, Social Sentinel, $9,500 for one year to 
monitor the social media postings of all students in one of its high 
schools in order to uncover cyberbullying and other threats.14 The 
school district’s position is that when it comes to those kinds of 
threats, students have “‘no expectation of privacy. That is the 
policy.’”15 This surveillance—in Jackson County, North Carolina, and 
other schools that have started using similar services—occurs no 
matter whether the students are engaged in or are suspected of being 
engaged in cyberbullying activity or even whether the students are 
involved in any activity that has any relationship at all to the school 
or its pedagogical interests.16 Potential abuses abound and actual 
 
12. Id. School administrators have lamented the difficulty with catching 
online bullying. In the case of another student suicide attempt in 
California after other students taunted the student online and called her 
“ugly” and “a whore,” the school principal investigated. However, she is 
quoted as saying, “‘It was pretty awful for a while, and we couldn’t 
substantiate any of it. It’s like chasing a tail or a piece of yarn . . . .’” 
Thomas & Murphy, supra note 2.  
13. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., the Supreme Court found 
that students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate.” 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Where those schoolhouse 
gates begin and end is now the question under cyberbullying laws. Part 
II will discuss the unprecedented breadth of surveillance authority 
currently provided to schools under these statutes.  
14. Quintin Ellison, School Officials to Monitor Students’ Social Media Use, 
Sylvia Herald, July 24, 2014, at 1A.  
15. Id. (quoting Jackson Schools’ Technology Director David Proffitt).  
16. Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schools Watch Students on the Internet, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 29, 2013, at A1; Kelly Wallace, At Some Schools, “Big 
Brother” Is Watching (Mar. 28, 2014, 9:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/11/08/living/schools-of-thought-social-media-monitoring-students/.  
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abuses have occurred. In 2010, school officials in Pennsylvania viewed 
students in their bedrooms because of surveillance made possible by 
the web cameras on school-issued laptops.17 Yet because schools are 
under pressure to avoid blame for tragedies like student suicide, there 
is good reason to think that more will use the implicit surveillance 
authority under cyberbullying.18  
It is with this surveillance authority that this Article is concerned. 
This Article argues that the cyberbullying laws, though well meaning, 
allow for an unprecedented expansion of school authority that 
implicates privacy harms, which are made more acute because the 
authority is held over the students by the schools. This grant of 
surveillance power to schools and its implications have largely gone 
overlooked by both scholars writing on the topic of bullying laws and 
privacy and surveillance studies scholars.19 Drawing on the more 
general work of these scholars and locating cyberbullying laws in that 
literature, this Article examines this grant of authority to schools and 
its harms and then calls for changes in the laws both to limit school 
surveillance authority and the privacy harms created by that 
authority. It should be noted that the surveillance with which this 
Article is concerned is distinct from the disciplinary authority of the 
schools under the cyberbullying laws. The surveillance happens before 
any act occurs for which some discipline might be warranted. 
Whether that discipline is appropriate is a topic beyond the scope of 
this Article.  
 
17. Suzan Clarke, Pa. School Faces FBI Probe, Lawsuit, for Using 
Webcams on Laptops to Watch Students at Home (Feb. 22, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Parenting/pennsylvania-school-fbi-probe-
webcam-students-spying/story?id=9905488. 
18. Indeed, even the companies that sell surveillance products and services 
to schools expect significant market growth. Wallace, supra note 16. 
19. The bullying scholarship tends to cover the constitutional implications 
of bullying laws and whether they violate the First and Fourth 
Amendments. To this Author’s knowledge, none of the scholarship 
addresses the surveillance authority implicit under cyberbullying laws or 
its privacy implications. E.g., Goodno, supra note 4. (suggesting a 
regulatory framework for cyberbullying but not addressing the implicit 
authority currently available to states). There is no doctrine yet on 
what, if any, legal limits exist on school authority to conduct 
surveillance or its implications. However, privacy scholars have written 
about topics such as privacy rights and the harms implicated by broad-
based government (as well as private) surveillance. E.g., Neil M. 
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1934 (2013); 
Danielle K. Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total 
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 
262 (2013); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 477 (2006). Those privacy harms apply in the school surveillance 
context as well and provide theoretical and policy bases for the 
argument that school surveillance authority should have legal limits.  
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Part I of this Article catalogs the cyberbullying laws, explaining 
the three levels into which the grants of surveillance authority to 
schools fall: (1) the grant of authority requiring a substantial nexus to 
the school or school-related activities; (2) the grant of authority with 
a more limited nexus to the school or school-related activities; and (3) 
the grant of authority with no nexus to school or school-related 
activities. This Part also describes how broad the potential scope of 
the surveillance authority given to schools in the majority of states 
really is. To show that the broad surveillance authority represents an 
unprecedented expansion of school authority, Part II begins by 
discussing extant limits on the school authority under First and 
Fourth Amendment student-speech and search doctrine as well as 
doctrine on government surveillance more generally. Although there 
are no clear doctrinal limits on general, broad-based surveillance of 
students, this First and Fourth Amendment doctrine offers guidance 
on the limits of school authority more generally. So too does doctrine 
on government surveillance outside the school context; thus it also 
offers some guideposts for the limits on state—and therefore school—
surveillance authority. This Part also explains how the surveillance 
authority under the majority of cyberbullying statutes exceeds or 
nearly exceeds all of these limits. While this expansion of school 
authority beyond its current limits might be deemed acceptable in the 
name of combatting cyberbullying, Part III explains why it is not: 
surveillance of students implicates privacy harms. This Part both 
outlines the privacy harms attendant to the enormous surveillance 
authority schools now have under the cyberbullying laws and 
contends that these harms are made more severe because the 
surveillance authority lies with the schools. Part IV then calls for 
changes in the cyberbullying laws both to limit schools’ surveillance 
authority and the attendant privacy harms and to allow students to 
seek redress when those limits on school surveillance authority have 
been transgressed. This Part argues in favor of an analytical 
framework that uses the nexus theory of school authority, developed 
under the First Amendment line of student-speech cases, for defining 
school authority to conduct electronic surveillance of students.  
I. The Cyberbullying Laws and Their Three Levels 
of School Surveillance Authority  
Under cyberbullying laws in the forty-six states and the District 
of Columbia, the grant of surveillance authority to schools falls into 
one of three categorical levels: (1) a grant of authority with no nexus 
to school or school-related activity;20 (2) a grant of authority with a 
 
20. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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limited nexus to school or school-related activity;21 and (3) a grant 
requiring a relatively substantial nexus to school or school-related 
activity.22 The vast majority of cyberbullying laws provide schools 
with surveillance authority that falls into one of the first two 
categories. In those states, the schools have nearly unlimited or 
unlimited surveillance authority over students’ online and electronic 
activity. Because it is perhaps easiest to understand the broadest 
grant of surveillance authority under cyberbullying laws by first 
understanding the most limited grant of authority under these laws, 
Part B of this section will first describe the most limited grant of 
school surveillance authority and work its way up through the other 
two categorical levels of school surveillance authority in ascending 
order. First, however, a more thorough description of the 
cyberbullying laws is warranted. 
A. The Cyberbullying Laws’ Implicit Authorization 
of Surveillance Authority 
 While they vary in the details, bullying laws in general have some 
of the same basic elements, regardless of whether they have a 
cyberbullying component. Bullying laws are, for the most part, 
creatures of states’ student disciplinary codes or regulatory schemes.23 
They either prohibit a student in a school from acting, even once, in a 
way that puts another student in reasonable fear of harm, or they 
prohibit a student in a school from engaging in potentially less severe 
but repeated behavior that effectively rises to the level of 
harassment.24 Ten states prohibit only repeated acts of bullying.25 
Thirty-five states prohibit both one-time and repeated acts of 
bullying.26 Nevada, for example, prohibits both a “willful act” or a 
 
21. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
23. See generally supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
24. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
25. Ala. Code § 16-28B (2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-222d(1) 
(Supp 2014); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1006.147(3)(a) (Supp. 2014); Ind. 
Code Ann. § 20-33-8-0.2(a) (West Supp. 2014); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
71, § 37O(a) (West Supp. 2014); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:416.13(c) 
(Supp. 2014); N.M. Code R. § 6.12.7.7(A) (LexisNexis 2014); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.666(A) (LexisNexis 2013); S.D. Codified 
Laws § 13-32-15 (Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 11 (Supp. 
2013).  
26. Alaska Stat. § 14.33.250(3) (2012); Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-
514(b)(2) (2009); Cal. Educ. Code § 48900(r)(1) (West Supp. 2014); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32-109.1(b) (2012); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D(a) (Supp. 2012); Ga. Code. Ann. § 20-2-751.4(a) (West 2012); 
Haw. Code R. § 8-19-2 (LexisNexis 2014); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-
917A(2) (2006); Ind. Code § 20-33-8-02(a) 2007; Kan. Stat. Ann. 
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“course of conduct” if the act or course of conduct “places the person 
in reasonable fear of harm or serious emotional distress; or . . . creates 
an environment which is hostile to a pupil by interfering with the 
education of the pupil.”27 
Bullying laws proscribing a one-time act, behavior, or conduct 
stipulate that the act, behavior, or conduct be directed toward 
another student and put that student in reasonable fear of physical or 
emotional harm or result in similarly harmful effects.28 Tennessee, for 
example, provides one definition of bullying as “any act that 
substantially interferes with a student’s educational benefits, 
opportunities or performance; and . . . has the effect of [k]nowingly 
placing a student or students in reasonable fear of physical harm.”29  
For statutes effectively proscribing harassment, behavior is 
subject to discipline if it substantially interferes with the target 
student’s educational performance or ability to benefit from the 
services or activities of school,30 or substantially disrupts the orderly 
operations of the school.31 In Iowa, “bullying” and “harassment” have 
the same definition in the school context.32 They are defined as 
 
§ 72-8256(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2013); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.070 
(West 2006); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 65549(2)(c) (Supp. 2013); 
Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-424(a)(2) (West 2012); Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 380.1310b(8)(b) (West 2013); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 121A.031(e) (West 2008); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-67(1) (Supp. 
2013); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 160.775(2) (West 2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 388.122 (Supp. 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:3 (2011); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:37-14 (West 2013); N.Y. Educ. Law § 11(7) 
(McKinney Supp. 2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-407.15(a) (2011); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-19-17 (Supp. 2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 
24-100.3(c)(1) (Supp. 2013); Or. Rev. Stat. § 339.351(2) (2011); 24 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 13-1303.1-A(e) (West Supp. 2014); R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 16-21-33(a)(1) (Supp. 2013); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-120 
(Supp. 2013); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4502(a) (2013); Tex. Educ. 
Code Ann. § 37.0832(a) (West Supp. 2014); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-
11a-102 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-276.01(A) 
(Supp. 2014); Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.300.285(2) (2012); W. Va. 
Code Ann. § 18-2C-2(a) (LexisNexis 2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-
312(a) (2011). 
27. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 388.122 (Supp. 2013). 
28. E.g., 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27-23.7(3) (West 2012).  
29. Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4502(a)(3) (2013). 
30. E.g., 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27-23.7(b)(3) (West 2012) (pro-
hibiting bullying that, among other things, “substantially [interferes] 
with the student’s or students’ academic performance”). 
31. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1310b(8)(b)(iv) (West 2013) 
(prohibiting bullying that causes, among other things, a “substantial 
disruption in, or substantial interference with, the orderly operation of 
the school”). 
32. Iowa Code § 280.28(2)(b) (2011). 
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conduct that “creates an objectively hostile school environment” and, 
among other things, “has the effect of substantially interfering with 
the student’s ability to participate in or benefit from the services, 
activities, or privileges provided by a school.”33 In New Hampshire, 
the bullying statute prohibits bullying, which is defined as including 
“a pattern of incidents” that “substantially disrupts the orderly 
operation of the school.”34 
In most (twenty-five) states, cyberbullying laws are simply 
additions to or variations of these general definitions of bullying.35 In 
these states, the relevant language typically specifies that bullying can 
happen by “electronic,” among other, means.36 Sixteen states, 
however, have separate statutory or regulatory definitions of 
cyberbullying.37 These definitions are very similar to the general 
 
33. Iowa Code § 280.28(2)(b) (2011). In Iowa, as in other states with this 
harassment-like component to the cyberbullying statutes, the impact at 
school is not clearly subjective or objective. Given the lack of clarity 
about the standard, the determination at the school level, then, is left to 
the school. Meaning, then, that the determination for practical purposes 
is subjective.  
34. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:3(1) (2011). 
35. Ala. Code § 16-28B (2012); Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-514 (2009); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32-109.1 (2012); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D (Supp. 2012); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); Idaho 
Code Ann. § 18-917A (2006); 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27-23.7 
(West 2012); Ind. Code Ann. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West Supp. 2014); Iowa 
Code § 280.28 (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:416.13 (Supp. 2014); 
Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-424 (West 2012); Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 380.1310b (West 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-67 (Supp. 
2013); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 160.775 (West 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18A:37-14 (West 2013); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-407.15 (2011); N.D. 
Cent. Code § 15.1-19-17 (Supp. 2013); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3313.666 (LexisNexis 2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 24-100.3 (Supp. 
2013); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 13-1303.1-A (West Supp. 2014); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-120 (Supp. 2013); S.D. Codified Laws § 13-
32-15 (Supp. 2013); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.0832 (West Supp. 
2014); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, § 11 (Supp. 2013); Va. Code Ann. 
§ 22.1-276.01 (Supp. 2014). 
36. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 4112D(1) (Supp. 2012) (defining 
bullying as “any intentional written, electronic, verbal, or physical act 
or actions against another student”). 
37. Cal. Educ. Code § 48900(r) (West Supp. 2014); Conn. Gen. Stat. 
Ann. § 10-222d (Supp. 2014); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1006.147 (West Supp. 
2014); Haw. Code R. § 8-19-2 (LexisNexis 2014); Kan. Stat. Ann. 
§ 72-8256 (Supp. 2013); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (Supp. 2013); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O (West Supp. 2014); Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 121A.0695 (West 2008); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 388.123 (Supp. 
2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:3 (2011); N.M. Code R. 
§ 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 2014); N.Y. Educ. Law § 11 (McKinney Supp. 
2014); Or. Rev. Stat. § 339.351 (2011); R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-21-33 
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definitions provided by bullying laws, but they detail the various 
electronic means by which cyberbullying can happen.38  
As noted in the Introduction, all of the states with cyberbullying 
laws authorize schools to monitor students’ online and electronic 
activity. None, however, do so explicitly. Instead, they implicitly 
allow schools to engage in surveillance of students’ online and 
electronic activity by authorizing or requiring that schools discipline 
students for electronic acts that constitute bullying.39 To discipline for 
cyberbullying, the schools have to know whether it happens, and the 
cyberbullying laws are silent regarding how schools might go about 
discovering the prohibited conduct. Knowing whether cyberbullying is 
happening can be a tricky business. With more traditional physical or 
verbal bullying, as well as other discipline problems, schools typically 
know about it because either it occurs in front of a teacher or other 
school staff or students report incidents of it. The stereotypical bully, 
for example, might threaten a student in school and then physically 
assault the student behind the school after class lets out for the day. 
The fight could easily draw attention and noise, alerting school staff 
and allowing them to intervene. Even if school staff did not know 
about the bullying, they might likely see evidence of it in the physical 
bruises of the involved students.  
Conversely, cyberbullying can easily occur without the school ever 
knowing about it, absent any student reporting, and the evidence of it 
is not very obvious or accessible. Unlike physical or verbal bullying, 
electronic acts cannot be readily seen or heard. Therefore, if a school 
is relying on the traditional means of knowing about student 
discipline issues—hearing or seeing them—the school will not know 
about the cyberbullying unless a student chooses to report it. Also 
unlike verbal or physical bullying, cyberbullying occurs in a nebulous 
time and space away from the eyes and ears of anyone other than the 
bully (or bullies) and the target. The time is nebulous because unlike 
in-person bullying, the electronic bullying message can be composed 
and sent at a time before, even significantly before, the target receives 
 
(Supp. 2013); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4502 (2013); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53A-11a-102 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
38. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1006.147(3)(b) (West Supp. 2014) (defining 
cyberbullying as, among other things, “bullying through the use of 
technology or any electronic communication, which includes, but is not 
limited to, any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic system, photoelectronic system, or phototopical 
system, including, but not limited to, electronic mail, Internet 
communications, instant messages, or facsimile communications”).  
39. E.g., South Carolina calls for “consequences and appropriate remedial 
actions for persons committing acts of . . . bullying.” S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 59-63-140(B)(4) (Supp. 2013). 
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the message. The message can sit waiting in the target’s e-mail inbox 
or on a smartphone or other electronic device for hours. Similarly, the 
space in which the bullying occurs is nebulous because the target can 
compose and send the bullying message from one location and the 
victim can receive it in a wholly different location. Indeed, even the 
physical location of the message can be unclear. Unlike some more 
traditional forms of bullying or harassment such as poison-pen letters, 
cyberbullying lacks tangibility. It exists somewhere, perhaps on a 
server somewhere, in the cloud, or elsewhere. The time and space in 
which the bullying occurs, therefore, is almost irrelevant to its impact. 
Regardless of where and when the bullying occurs, once the victim 
receives the message, its impact can be felt. Yet, the nebulous nature 
of its time and space occurrence does create difficulties for knowing 
about, accessing evidence of, and therefore addressing the bullying 
behavior. If a student sends a bullying message to another student at 
school, but the message is not received until the target is at home in 
the late hours of the night, the school may have difficulty both 
knowing it happened and administering the requisite discipline.40  
One obvious way to overcome these difficulties and determine if 
students are engaged in cyberbullying is for schools, to the extent the 
cyberbullying laws allow it, to develop or acquire a system to monitor 
their students’ online and electronic activity wherever and whenever 
it occurs. Since the cyberbullying laws do not prohibit such 
surveillance, the statutes implicitly allow the schools to monitor 
students’ online and electronic activity, and schools, as discussed 
below, are starting to grab this implicit authority to conduct 
surveillance of all students’ online and electronic activity.41  
To an extent, schools’ embrace of this implicit authority is 
understandable. Of the ways to determine if students are engaged in 
cyberbullying and therefore should be disciplined, a comprehensive 
surveillance system is probably the most effective and efficient means. 
Keeping electronic tabs on all students’ online and electronic activity 
works to root out cyberbullying because it involves collecting 
information on all students’ online and electronic activity, including 
any cyberbullying. It also therefore serves as the way to prevent a 
tragic suicide due to unaddressed cyberbullying. 
To be sure, there are alternatives to this comprehensive 
surveillance method. Schools could confiscate all students’ electronic 
devices to determine whether they are engaged in cyberbullying. 
 
40. S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-140(B)(4) (Supp. 2013). 
41. Schools often cannot discipline students under these laws without some 
impact of the bullying being felt at school, but they can nonetheless 
monitor students’ online and electronic activity more broadly in an 
effort to determine if the activity creates the requisite discipline-
invoking impact. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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Setting aside any potential Fourth Amendment problems with this 
method, this option is simply impractical in that it would require 
schools to review students’ online and electronic activity one by one.42 
In addition to being impractical, the method would be only partially 
effective at best. With applications like Snapchat that can erase 
messages shortly after they are sent and received, confiscating the 
physical electronic devices may not result in schools’ actually seeing 
and knowing about the bullying messages.43  
Alternatively, schools could follow students on social media. Like 
the confiscation method, this method is similarly inefficient and likely 
ineffective.44 It is inefficient because it would be difficult to know all 
the social media platforms on which to follow students, and it would 
be challenging at best to follow every student on all social media. It is 
also likely ineffective because students know when someone starts to 
follow them on social media.45 The bully who makes any effort to not 
get caught could just choose a different form of social media—one on 
which he or she is not being followed by school staff—to carry out the 
bullying activity.  
Schools could also just rely on the traditional method of student 
reporting. They could wait for students who are subjected to 
cyberbullying to inform them of the problem and then intervene. 
However, this option is similarly ineffective and inefficient if schools 
are working to really root out all cyberbullying.46 Unless every student 
who experiences cyberbullying reports it to the school, the school will 
not be able to know about all the cyberbullying that is happening 
among its students. If one missed instance results in a suicide or 
suicide attempt, the school will face enormous criticism and scrutiny.  
Instead, schools that are confronting these challenges head-on are 
opting for more global and efficient methods of monitoring of 
students’ online and electronic activity when they have the authority 
to do so. As explained below, most of the states have this implicit 
authority, and some schools are therefore starting to employ 
 
42. This is not to say that these Fourth Amendment concerns are 
insignificant. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that police 
searches of cell phones, even incident to arrest, require a warrant. Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
43. Snapchat Guide for Parents, Snapchat http://www.snapchat.com/ 
static_files/parents.pdf (May 1, 2014). Theoretically a school could still 
see an infringing Snapchat if the student screenshot the message before 
it disappeared.  
44. See Thomas & Murphy, supra note 2; Sengupta, supra note 16. 
45. See, e.g., Twitter, INC., FAQs About Following, https://support. 
twitter.com/articles/14019-faqs-about-following (last visited June 24, 
2014).  
46. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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companies, such as Geo Listening and Safe Outlook Corporation, to 
conduct comprehensive surveillance of students.47 According to the 
president of Geo Listening, Chris Frydrych, the company’s service 
works by looking for “keywords and sentiments” on public posts by 
students.48 Instead of providing a service, Safe Outlook Corporation 
sells a product called CompuGuardian, which allows for keyword 
searches of students’ online activity.49 David Jones, the president of 
Safe Outlook Corporation, was quoted as saying that by utilizing 
CompuGuardian, “you can identify a student, and you can jump into 
their activity logs and see exactly what they’ve typed, exactly where 
they’ve gone, exactly what they’ve done, and it gives you some 
history that you can go back to that child and use some disciplinary 
action.”50  
Not only are schools and school districts paying large sums for 
these services and products, but the companies also expect the sales 
and use of their products and services to grow. In 2013, Glendale 
School District in California paid Geo Listening more than $40,000 to 
monitor students’ social media posts.51 As of October 2013, at least 
two school districts and three schools were paying Safe Outlook 
Corporation between $4,000 and $9,000 per year for the use of its 
technology, and the company’s president “expects the number of 
schools participating to go up.”52 Frydrych of Geo Listening expected 
to have 3,000 schools paying for his company’s services by the end of 
2013.53  
B. Three Levels of Surveillance Authority  
In Glendale, California, the school district has interpreted its 
power under the cyberbullying statutes to allow it to conduct the 
surveillance it pays Geo Listening to do because the California 
cyberbullying statute implicitly authorizes surveillance of students.54 
Although the majority of cyberbullying statutes are like California’s 
in that they implicitly authorize unlimited or nearly unlimited 
surveillance of students’ online and electronic activity, not all states 
 
47. See Sengupta, supra note 16; Wallace, supra note 16.  
48. Sengupta, supra note 16. 
49. Wallace, supra note 16. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Sengupta, supra note 16. 
54. Cal. Ed. Code § 48900(r) (West Supp. 2014) (providing authority for 
schools to punish cyberbullying and therefore implicitly authorizing 
schools to monitor students’ electronic activity to discover the 
prohibited electronic acts). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates 
78 
go so far. Some states require at least some nexus to school. While the 
use of this surveillance authority is very new, and the authority for it 
has not been plainly articulated or delineated, the clearest parameters 
for the implicit authority to monitor students’ online and electronic 
activity lies in the authority to uncover cyberbullying behavior for 
which schools have the authority to discipline students. The nexus 
required by some states’ laws is required in order to have authority to 
discipline. Although the cyberbullying laws’ silence on the authority 
to conduct electronic surveillance of students leaves open the question 
of whether even more surveillance by schools is permitted, the schools’ 
best argument that their surveillance is authorized lies in their need 
to uncover cyberbullying behavior for which they have the authority 
to then discipline students.  
1. Authorizing School Surveillance of Student Online 
and Electronic Activity If It Occurs at School or a Specific 
School-Related Event or Activity 
Fifteen states require schools to have a substantial nexus to 
school in order to discipline students for cyberbullying.55 These 
 
55. These states are: Alabama, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. Ala. Code § 16-28B 
(2012); IOWA Code § 280.28 (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:416.13 
(Supp. 2014); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-67 (Supp. 2013); Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 79-2,137 (Supp. 2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 388.135 (Supp. 
2013); N.M. Code R. § 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
115C-407.15 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-19-17 (Supp. 2013); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.666 (LexisNexis 2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 
24-100.4 (Supp. 2013); Or. Rev. Stat. § 339.351 (2011); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 59-63-120(1)(a) (Supp. 2013); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 
37.0832 (West Supp. 2014); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-312 (2011). 
Oregon also authorizes schools to discipline for cyberbullying if it 
happens on property adjacent to school property. Or. Rev. Stat. § 
339.351 (2011). An argument could be made that Louisiana falls into 
the “no nexus” category of states because it allows schools to discipline 
for cyberbullying and bullying “at a school-sponsored or school-related 
function or activity,” which could include activities such as a student 
doing homework in her bedroom. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 17:416.13(C)(2)(a) (Supp. 2014).  That said, the specificity with which 
the statutes delineate where students can be when schools have 
authority to discipline for bullying, including “on school property, at a 
school-sponsored or school-related function or activity, in any school bus 
or van, at any designated school bus stop, in any other school or private 
vehicle used to transport students to and from schools, or any school-
sponsored activity or event,” suggests the statute requires something 
more than virtually no nexus to school. Id. The same is also true for 
South Carolina’s statute, which defines “school” (where bullying for 
which schools can discipline can happen) as “in a classroom, on school 
premises, on a school bus or other school-related vehicle, at an official 
school bus stop, at a school-sponsored activity or event whether or not 
it is held on school premises, or at another program or function where 
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“activity nexus” states authorize schools to discipline students for 
cyberbullying it if happens in school or when the students are 
physically on schoolhouse property.56 In addition, some of these states 
provide schools with the authority to discipline students for 
cyberbullying if it happens outside the physical school building or off 
the physical property of the school but still at school-sponsored 
activities.57 More specifically, several states allow schools to discipline 
for cyberbullying that happens on the school bus.58 Several more 
states expressly allow schools to discipline for cyberbullying if it 
happens on any school or school-provided transportation, school bus 
or otherwise.59 Certain states call on schools to discipline students for 
cyberbullying that happens at school bus stops.60 One state, 
Louisiana, provides for student discipline if cyberbullying happens on 
the way to or from school no matter the type or ownership of the 
transportation used.61 Nine states call on schools to discipline students 
for cyberbullying that happens at any school-sponsored or sanctioned 
events.62 
Because schools in these activity nexus states cannot discipline 
students without that nexus, the schools have a relatively weak 
 
the school is responsible for the child.” S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-
120(1)(a) (Supp. 2013). 
56. Id.  
57. Id.  
58. See e.g., Ala. Code § 16-28B (2012); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-67 
(Supp. 2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 388.135 (Supp. 2013); N.Y. Educ. 
Law § 11 (McKinney Supp. 2014); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-407.15 
(2011); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.666 (LexisNexis 2013). 
59. See e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:416.13 (Supp. 2014); Neb. Rev. 
Stat. § 79-2,137 (Supp. 2013); N.M. Code R. § 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 
2014); N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-19-17 (Supp. 2013); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 339.351 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-120 (Supp. 2013); Tex. 
Educ. Code Ann. § 37.0832 (West Supp. 2014); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53A-11a-201(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-
312 (2011). 
60. See e.g., N.M. Code R. § 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 2014); Or. Rev. Stat. 
§ 339.351 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-120 (Supp. 2013); Utah 
Code Ann. § 53A-11a-201(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). 
61. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.7(C) (Supp. 2014) (“An offense com-
mitted pursuant to the provisions of this Section may be deemed to 
have been committed where the communication was originally sent, 
originally received, or originally viewed by any person.”). 
62. Ala. Code § 16-28B (2012); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.7 (Supp. 
2014); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-11-67 (Supp. 2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 388.123 (Supp. 2013); N.M. Code R. § 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 2014); 
N.Y. Educ. Law § 11 (McKinney Supp. 2014); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 3313.666 (LexisNexis 2013); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-120 (Supp. 
2013); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.0832 (West Supp. 2014). 
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argument that they have authority to monitor students’ online or 
electronic activity absent such a link. While a lack of any explicit 
authorization to conduct surveillance is not the same as a prohibition, 
the schools in these activity nexus states have no valid basis for 
conducting surveillance of students when they cannot discipline for 
the conduct they uncover. For example, if a student is at home using 
a smartphone in his or her bedroom, and the smartphone use has no 
relationship to school, the student cannot be disciplined at school for 
any online or electronic activity conducted at that time. Therefore, 
schools have no foundation for monitoring students to determine if 
that conduct warrants discipline.  
New Mexico is an example of an activity nexus state. New 
Mexico’s definition of bullying is contained in its administrative code. 
New Mexico Administrative Code Section 6.12.7.7 prohibits bullying, 
including bullying by “electronic expression.” However, it limits its 
definition of bullying to that which occurs “in the school, on school 
grounds, in school vehicles, at a designated school bus top, or at 
school activities or sanctioned events.”63 Outside these activities, 
schools in New Mexico cannot discipline for cyberbullying and 
therefore have scant reason to conduct surveillance on students 
outside these contexts.  
2. Authorizing School Surveillance of Students’ Online and Electronic 
Activity If It Has a Nexus to School Equipment or Networks 
In seven states, the cyberbullying statutes require a less 
substantial nexus to school in order to discipline for and therefore 
monitor students’ online and electronic activity.64 In these “ownership 
nexus” states, the schools can discipline students for cyberbullying if 
it is done using a school computer, school electronic equipment, a 
school network, or other school property.65 Two of these states, 
Kansas and Rhode Island, prohibit cyberbullying through the use of 
any school property, which of course could include school computers 
or networks.66 The rest prohibit cyberbullying if a student uses either 
school networks or equipment to do it.67 In these states, if a student is 
 
63. N.M. Code R. § 6.12.7.7(A) (LexisNexis 2014).  
64. These states are: Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, 
and Rhode Island. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-341 (2012); Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 14, § 4112D (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-751.4 (West 
2012); 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27-23.7 (West 2012); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 72-8256 (Supp. 2013); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1310b 
(West 2014); R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-21-33 (Supp. 2013). 
65. Id.  
66. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-8256 (Supp. 2013); R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-21-33 
(Supp. 2013). 
67. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-341 (2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2014); 105 Ill. Comp. 
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at home using a school-issued and -owned tablet to engage in 
cyberbullying, then the school can discipline for it. However, the 
school cannot discipline for cyberbullying if the student is at home 
but using a personal tablet or other device and a private network. 
Because the authority to discipline is so limited, the surveillance 
authority is too, at least implicitly. If a student is not using school 
equipment or a school network, the schools have no authority to 
discipline and therefore little to no authority to monitor students’ 
online and electronic activity. 
Illinois has such an ownership nexus statute.68 In Illinois the 
definition of bullying and prohibition against it is contained in its 
statutory code. Illinois Compiled Statute Section 105-5/27-23.7 states 
that “[n]o student shall be subjected to bullying.” It goes on to define 
cyberbullying as that which occurs “through the transmission of 
information from a school computer, a school computer network, or 
other similar electronic school equipment.”69 In Illinois, then, since the 
schools can only discipline for cyberbullying that occurs through the 
use of school equipment or networks, they have little, if any, 
legitimate basis for monitoring students’ online and electronic activity 
when that activity is not conducted through the school equipment or 
networks.  
While it might seem that the school equipment or network 
limitation on these schools’ surveillance authority is significant, in 
actuality these states still authorize schools to conduct very broad 
surveillance of students that goes beyond the time and space of school 
itself. First, the schools could, if they were so inclined, conceivably go 
beyond the surveillance authority implicitly provided in these laws 
because the laws lack any mechanism for controlling schools’ use of 
their authority. The laws have no cause of action or other device to 
hold schools accountable if schools exceed any implicit surveillance 
authority in the laws.70 Therefore, if schools choose to monitor 
students’ online and electronic activity conducted with school 
equipment or networks, and they choose or allow surveillance to bleed 
into student activity done without the use of school equipment or 
networks, students have little, if any, means to stop them.71  
 
Stat. 5/27-23.7 (West 2012); Mich. Comp. LawS ANN. § 380.1310b 
(West 2013). 
68. 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/27-23.7(a) (West 2012).  
69. 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/27-23.7(a)(3) (West 2012). 
70. See infra Part III.B.3. 
71. Of course, this is true of most statutes providing the state with 
authority but not offering enforcement mechanisms when the state 
exceeds that authority. Thus, the need exists for a cause of action to 
limit the misuse of state authority. See infra Part IV.A. 
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Also, if a student chooses to engage in online or electronic activity 
at home and after school but uses school equipment or networks to do 
it, then the school can still monitor the student’s online and electronic 
activity even though it occurs in a time and space beyond the school 
and school day. While it is true that students could circumvent a 
school’s surveillance authority by using their own equipment and 
networks, for some students this circumvention is not so easy or 
simple. Consider low-income students. They are less likely than high-
income students to own a computer and much less likely to own a 
tablet.72 So while students from high-income families can escape school 
surveillance by using their own equipment or networks, low-income 
students cannot so readily escape it. The ownership nexus limitation 
on the schools’ surveillance authority, therefore, really only protects 
privileged students who need not rely on school equipment to access 
electronic data.  
In addition, given that the student population in the public 
schools is increasingly low-income, the ownership nexus is increasingly 
less of a limitation on school surveillance authority.73 In seventeen 
states the majority of students in public schools are low-income, and 
for them, it is likely that school equipment and networks are their 
only regular access to certain electronic data and equipment.74 Indeed, 
many schools, in part out of recognition of these changing 
demographics, are giving out technology to students, including 
equipment like iPads, as additional learning tools.75 As a result, 
 
72. In the lowest income households (those earning less than $30,000 per 
year), only 73 percent own a computer versus 81 percent of the highest 
income households (those earning more than $75,000 per year) owning a 
computer. Mary Madden et al., Teens and Technology 2013, PEW 
RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT at 6 (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www. 
pewinternet.org/2013/03/13/main-findings-5/. Income is very predictive 
of owning a tablet, with only 15 percent of teens in the lowest income 
households compared to 31 percent of teens in the highest income 
households owning a tablet. Id.  
73. Steven Suitts, A New Majority: Low Income Students in the South and 
Nation, SOUTHERN EDUCATION FUND 8 (Oct. 2013), http://www. 
southerneducation.org/getattachment/0bc70ce1-d375-4ff6-8340-f9b3452 
ee088/A-New-Majority-Low-Income-Students-in-the-South-an.aspx 
(providing statistics suggesting an increase in the number of low-income 
students).  
74. Id. at 2 tbl.1 (listing states with “a majority of low income students in 
public schools” in 2011). 
75. The Los Angeles Unified School District has famously given out iPads to 
all of its students, and other school systems from Ohio to Alabama have 
done the same. Howard Blume & Steven Ceasar, As Schools Give 
Students Computers, Price of L.A.’s Program Stands Out, L.A. Times, 
Dec. 31, 2013, available at http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-ipads-
schools-20140101-story.html#page=1.  
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students in ownership nexus states who do not have a personal tablet 
device to use at home, but who want to become familiar with this 
increasingly common technology,76 will potentially be subjected to 
surveillance. To be fair, schools need some authority to control their 
own equipment, but this authority does not require the broadening of 
surveillance authority. Schools have already abused this authority to 
control their own equipment by committing serious intrusions into 
student privacy, including watching students in their homes and 
bedrooms through webcams in school-owned equipment.77 Instead, 
schools should employ available means other than comprehensive 
surveillance to control their devices. Schools, for example, can block 
websites and the ability of students to download applications onto the 
devices.78  
Finally, expecting students to forego technology in order to avoid 
surveillance by schools is unrealistic and denies the allure technology 
has for young people. In their book Liquid Surveillance,79 Zygmunt 
Bauman and David Lyon discuss the concept they call “liquid 
surveillance.” Among other things, Bauman and Lyon conceive of 
liquid surveillance as a fluid way of thinking of surveillance.80 The 
authors point to the fluidity of surveillance in the consumer world, 
where consumption is the result of “the pleasurable seduction of 
consumers.”81 They argue that people submit to surveillance and the 
attendant “loss of privacy as a reasonable price for the wonders 
offered in exchange.”82 An example of such submission is the loyalty 
cards that offer discounts at grocery stores.83 Bauman & Lyon cite an 
 
76. According to a 2012 study by the Pew Research Center, 95 percent of 
teens are online, and 78 percent have a cell phone of some kind. See 
Madden et al., supra note 72, at 2–3. 
77. For example, in Pennsylvania, students accused a school official of 
activating web cameras on school-owned laptops to watch students 
while they were at home. See Clarke, supra note 17. 
78. While this solution has not always been perfect, as evidenced by Los 
Angeles Unified School District’s initial iPad rollout in which students 
got beyond the security controls quickly, the controls ultimately get 
fixed. Howard Blume, LAUSD Halts Home Use of iPads for Students 
After Devices Hacked, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 2013, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/25/local/la-me-ln-lausd-ipad-hack-
20130925.  
79. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & DAVID LYON, LIQUID SURVEILLANCE 2 (2013). 
80. Id. at 4–5. 
81. Id. at 121. 
82. Zygmunt Bauman, On Never Being Alone Again, SOCIAL EUROPE J. 
June 28, 2011, http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/06/on-never-being-
alone-again/. 
83. BAUMAN & LYON, supra note 79 at 128 (internal citation omitted). 
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international study that found people “‘either don’t know or don’t 
care’ about the connections between the use of loyalty cards and 
profiling.”84 People submit to the surveillance to get the benefits of 
the loyalty cards.85 It is reasonable to expect that surveillance of 
students by schools through school equipment and networks is 
similarly liquid. Surveillance is liquid in the sense that it is hard for 
students to turn down technology’s wonders in the name of privacy or 
security. This is probably especially true for low-income students. 
Even if the students could turn down equipment like school-issued 
tablets (and they may not be able to if their schoolwork must be done 
on a tablet) in order to forego surveillance, it would be expecting a lot 
of students to make that decision. Students live in a technology 
driven world where they are more likely to submit to the lures of 
technology, like free laptops and iPads from their school, than to 
sacrifice this equipment in the name of increased privacy.86 To dismiss 
the surveillance authorized in these seven ownership nexus states 
under cyberbullying statutes as optional, then, is to ignore the 
strength of the technology’s appeal and the ubiquity of its use.  
3. Authorizing School Surveillance of Student Electronic Activity 
Without Any Nexus to the School or School-Related Activities 
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have statutes 
that allow for virtually unlimited surveillance of students’ online and 
electronic activity.87 These “zero nexus” laws implicitly authorize 
 
84. Id.  
85. Id.  
86. See CBSNEWS, $610K Settlement in School Webcam Spy Case (Oct. 
21, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/610k-settlement-in-school-
webcam-spy-case/ (noting that even after catching school officials using 
his webcam to view activities within his bedroom, the spied-upon 
Harrington High School student “says his computer behaviors haven’t 
changed much . . . .”). 
87. These states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and the 
District of Columbia. Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-514 (2009); Cal. Educ. 
Code § 48900 (West Supp. 2014); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32-109.1 
(2012); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-222d(b)(16) (2010); Fla. Stat. 
Ann. § 1006.147 (West Supp. 2014); Haw. Code R. § 8-19-2( 
(LexisNexis 2014); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-917A (2006); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West Supp. 2014); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 20-A, 
§ 6554 (Supp. 2013); Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-424 (West 2012); 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71, § 37O (West Supp. 2014); Minn. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 121A.0695, 121A.031 (West 2008); Mo. Ann. Stat. 
§ 160.775 (West 2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193-F:4 (2011); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:37-14 (West 2014); N.Y. Educ. Law § 11 
(McKinney Supp. 2014); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 13-1303.1-A(d) 
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schools to monitor students’ online and electronic activity regardless 
of where or when it is conducted. For example, California’s statute 
prohibits bullying by “electronic act,” which act serves as grounds for 
suspension or expulsion of the student when it occurs.88 While the 
statute discusses the acts of bullying in relation to school activities 
and attendance, in reality there is no limit in the statute on where or 
when the bullying can occur.89 Because schools have the authority to 
punish bullying that occurs anywhere and at any time by electronic 
act, they implicitly have the authority to search for and discover it 
whenever and wherever it occurs.90 This interpretation provides the 
authority for Glendale School District’s use of Geo Listening to 
conduct comprehensive surveillance of all of its students’ online and 
electronic activity.91  
Other states are even more liberal than California in the broad 
grant of authority to schools to punish, and therefore monitor, 
students’ online and electronic activity. Indiana and New York are 
two such states that exhibit the breadth of school authority.92 Indiana 
prohibits bullying, including cyberbullying, by students “regardless of 
the physical location in which the bullying behavior occur[s].”93 New 
York defines bullying, including cyberbullying, to consist of certain 
activity that occurs “off school property.”94 Although the New York 
 
(West Supp. 2014); S.D. Codified Laws § 13-32-15 (Supp. 2013); 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4502 (Supp. 2013); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-
11a-201(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, 
§ 11(a)(32)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2013); Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.300.285 
(2012); W. Va. Code § 18-2C-2 (LexisNexis 2012); D.C. Code §§ 2-
1535.01 to 2-1535.09. 
88. Cal. Educ. Code § 48900(r) (West Supp. 2014).  
89. Id. The subsequent provision requires the acts enumerated in the section 
to be “related to a school activity or school attendance” before discipline 
can be ordered. § 48900(s) (West Supp. 2014). However, many electronic 
activities can occur off school grounds and still be related to school 
activity. See, e.g., infra note 122 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 
same provision specifically notes that the disciplinable act may occur “at 
any time” § 48900(s) (West Supp. 2014). The provision goes on to list 
periods where this activity may occur, all of which are tied to the 
school’s campus, the school day, or travel to and from a school-
sponsored activity. Id. However, the text explicitly notes that this list is 
inexhaustive. Id. 
90. See Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMMS. 
& HIGH TECH. L. 357 (2011) (explaining why common law privacy torts 
have limited utility for redressing surveillance in the digital age).  
91. See supra Part I.A.  
92. Ind. Code Ann. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West Supp. 2014); N.Y. Educ. Law 
§ 11(7) (McKinney Supp. 2014). 
93. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-13.5(b) (West Supp. 2014). 
94. N.Y. Educ. Law § 11(7) (McKinney Supp. 2014). 
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statute, like many but certainly not all,95 goes on to qualify the 
definition so that the off-campus bullying has to “create or foreseeably 
create a risk of substantial disruption within the school environment, 
where it is foreseeable that the conduct, threats, intimidation, or 
abuse might reach school property,” this qualification does nothing to 
limit the surveillance authority of the school.96 While schools in New 
York cannot discipline for bullying that they learn about if it occurs 
off campus and creates no risk of substantial disruption or the threats 
reaching the school, they can still monitor students’ online and 
electronic activity occurring off-campus to determine if they can and 
should discipline students. Again, as with the cyberbullying statutes 
more generally, surveillance allows schools to know about the activity 
for which they may need to discipline students regardless of whether 
they actually will have the authority to discipline for it.  
What can this enormous level of surveillance authority mean for 
students? Imagine that two teenage, female students who attend the 
same school get into an argument during summer break. The 
argument takes place entirely over text and social media apps on the 
students’ smart phones. The argument has nothing to do with school, 
and it occurs during non-school, summer break hours. The messages 
the girls send and receive are only sent to and received from their 
homes and other non-school locations. Because their school district 
has CompuGuardian, however, it learns of the argument as well as 
much or all of the other information the students have posted 
electronically, irrespective of its relationship to school or bullying. 
Through CompuGuardian, school staff members are alerted to 
messages sent by one of the girls that could be misinterpreted as 
cyberbullying. Although the girls resolve their argument and are 
friends again by the time school resumes after summer break, the girl 
who sent the misinterpreted message is suspended on the first day of 
school for cyberbullying. The school’s position is that the discipline is 
warranted because the summer argument could disrupt the school. In 
addition to the discipline, both girls are now acutely aware that the 
school is monitoring their electronic communications, and they start 
 
95. California’s statute, for example, does not require that the electronic 
bullying have an impact at school in order to subject the bully to 
discipline. By authorizing schools to discipline students for electronic 
acts, without limitation on where or when they occur, it allows 
California to monitor all students’ electronic acts. If those acts, for 
example, “can be reasonably predicted to have the effect of . . . placing 
a reasonable pupil . . . in fear of harm to that pupil’s . . . person or 
property,” then the school can suspend or expel the bully, regardless of 
where the electronic act took place or where the student was when in 
fear of harm to her person or property. Cal. Educ. Code § 48900(r) 
(West Supp. 2014); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
96. N.Y. Educ. Law § 11(7) (McKinney Supp. 2014). 
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limiting what they say about anything the school could uncover and 
object to, including messages about schoolwork. In this easily 
imagined hypothetical case, the school surveillance authority reaches 
beyond school space and time. It results both in the suspension of a 
girl for actions that she and her friend have since resolved and the 
school’s collecting large amounts of data on these and other students, 
much of which has nothing to do with school or bullying.  
II. An Unprecedented Expansion of School Authority 
Given the novelty of school authority under cyberbullying laws to 
conduct surveillance of students’ online and electronic activity, it is 
not surprising that there is no doctrine on point regarding its limits. 
Thus, understanding how school surveillance authority reflects an 
expansion of traditional limits on school authority requires looking to 
other doctrinal restrictions on school authority to get a sense of where 
courts have been willing to draw boundaries. Overarching consti-
tutional limits on school authority derive from First and Fourth 
Amendment student-speech and search doctrines. While school 
surveillance authority does not fit squarely into either the First or 
Fourth Amendment school doctrine, it touches on elements of both, 
thus providing relevant guidance on the limits of school authority. 
More generally, Supreme Court doctrine on government surveillance 
provides some guideposts to assess the limits of state and therefore 
school surveillance authority.  
A. The Limits of School Authority Under First Amendment Doctrine 
1. Schools’ Expanded Authority to Regulate Student Speech 
Schools generally have more authority than state actors under the 
Constitution to regulate student speech. That authority in some 
circumstances extends beyond the physical boundaries of the school. 
Thus, First Amendment doctrine offers insight into where the courts 
have been willing to draw lines regarding school authority. In Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,97 the Supreme 
Court articulated both a willingness to protect student speech in 
school and recognized that students’ First Amendment rights in 
school are not coextensive with those rights in other contexts. The 
students in Tinker were disciplined for wearing black armbands to 
school in protest of the Vietnam War.98 They challenged the 
disciplinary action on First Amendment grounds.99 Famously 
pronouncing that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to 
 
97. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
98. Id. at 504. 
99. Id. at 505. 
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freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”100 the Court 
went on to find that student speech may nonetheless be limited if it 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others.”101 Finding no such disruption, 
disorder, or invasion, the Court overturned the school disciplinary 
action as a violation of the First Amendment.102  
Because the students in Tinker wore their armbands in the school 
building, the standard articulated in that case for limiting student 
speech—a material and substantial disruption or invasion of the rights 
of others—applies in that specific setting. Tinker did not have cause 
to address where the boundaries of “in school” begin and end. 
Therefore, while a school’s increased authority to impinge on 
students’ free-speech rights may or may not extend beyond the 
schoolhouse gate, Tinker did not decide that issue.103  
Other Supreme Court cases on student speech have done little to 
clarify the physical or temporal boundaries of school authority. In 
Bethel School District v. Fraser,104 the Supreme Court found that 
schools have an increased authority, as compared to other state 
actors, to regulate students who make lewd speech in school.105 In 
Fraser, a student was disciplined for making a vulgar speech at a 
school assembly.106 In finding that the school could regulate the 
speech, and therefore discipline the student, the Court again did not 
have reason to define where the boundaries of “in school” begin and 
end. As in Tinker, the student in question made the lewd speech in 
school,107 and the holding was limited to those narrow facts. Though 
Fraser did not address the physical boundaries associated with this 
increased authority to regulate student speech, Morse v. Frederick108 
later clarified that the authority to regulate students’ lewd speech was 
 
100. Id. at 506.  
101. Id. at 513. The Tinker opinion also indicated that student speech
“‘materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, . . . .’” Id. at 509 
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).  
102. Id. at 514. 
103. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme 
Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school’s authority to regulate 
expression that . . . does not occur on school grounds or at a school-
sponsored event.”). 
104. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
105. Id. at 685. 
106. Id. at 677–78. 
107. Id. 
108. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  
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limited to the physical school setting.109 In Morse, the majority stated 
that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech outside the school 
context, it would have been protected.”110  
Morse and an earlier case, Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,111 identified some specific kinds of speech that can be 
regulated by the school regardless of whether the speech physically 
occurs within the school setting. In Kuhlmeier, the Court considered 
speech made by students in a school newspaper.112 It concluded that 
schools generally have more authority than the state does to regulate 
school-sponsored student speech—such as speech made through a 
student newspaper.113 In Morse v. Frederick, more famously known as 
the “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” case, the Court considered whether a sign 
held up by a student at an off-campus, school-sponsored activity that 
could be interpreted to support illegal drug use could be regulated by 
the school.114 It concluded that drug-supporting speech at school-
sponsored activities, off-campus or not, can be regulated by schools.115 
For school-sponsored speech and drug-supporting speech at school-
sponsored activities, the school boundaries are broader than the 
school boundaries for lewd speech: they extend beyond the physical 
location of the school.  
Since Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse apply specifically to lewd 
speech, school-sponsored speech, and drug-supporting speech at 
school-sponsored activities, they do not determine the boundaries of 
school authority in other contexts—most relevantly when the school is 
conducting surveillance of students’ online and electronic activity 
outside the school. The federal appellate courts have therefore been 
left to grapple with applying the Tinker standard to address discipline 
of students’ online speech when it does not occur in the school 
building or at a school-related or sponsored event.116 The Circuits 
have developed two different standards for evaluating the extent of 
school authority to discipline students for speech that occurs online 
and off-campus. One line of cases from the Second,117 Third,118 and 
 
109. Id. 405.  
110. Id. 
111. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  
112. Id. at 262.  
113. Id. at 273.  
114. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
115. Id. at 410.  
116. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 346 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the 
Tinker standard to school discipline of online student activity that 
occurred off school property). 
117. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (regarding a 
student’s online instant message). 
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Eighth119 Circuits use essentially the Tinker standard or a variation of 
it. The Second Circuit has articulated its test as one that permits 
schools to regulate what might otherwise be protected speech made 
online and off-campus if the speech poses a reasonably foreseeable risk 
that it will both “come to the attention of school authorities and that 
it would ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline 
of the school.’”120 If the student speech meets this test, then the 
boundaries of the school extend beyond campus to virtually any place 
the speech occurs. The Second Circuit, in Doninger v. Niehoff,121 
found such a reasonably foreseeable risk when a student made a blog 
post at home, and the blog was hosted on a website wholly 
unaffiliated with school.122 The Court found that the blog post, which 
invited students to protest the school superintendent’s decision 
regarding the date and location of a school jam fest music event, 
“directly pertained to an event” at school and “invited other students 
to read and respond to it by contacting school officials.”123 Thus, the 
Court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the post 
would “reach school property and have disruptive consequences 
there.”124  
The Fourth Circuit has a somewhat different approach for the 
standard for determining the breadth of school authority to regulate 
students’ off-campus and online speech. In Kowalski v. Berkeley 
County Schools,125 a student created a MySpace page that was 
“largely dedicated to ridiculing a fellow student.”126 The student who 
 
118. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(finding that a student who was suspended for creating a MySpace page 
about her school principal on the weekend using her home computer 
could not be disciplined without violating the First Amendment). 
119. S.J.W. v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that where a student’s blog post was made at home and on a 
platform unaffiliated with the school, the “student speech that causes a 
substantial disruption is not protected”). 
120. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38–39. 
121. Doninger, 642 F.3d at 344.  
122. Id. at 348.  
123. Id.  
124. Id. As with the statutes that do not specify whether the determination 
of the impact on school is subjective or objective, the court did not 
clarify whether the assessment of the “disruptive consequences” at 
school would be subjective or objective. Id. Again, given that the 
determination is then largely left to the school at the school level by 
school staff, it is for practical purposes a subjective determination made 
by those school staff members. See supra note 31 and accompanying 
text.  
125. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
126. Id. at 567. 
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created the MySpace page was suspended from school for five days 
and challenged the suspension on First Amendment grounds.127 The 
Court concluded that the school could regulate student off-campus 
and online speech if the nexus between the speech and the school’s 
pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the disciplinary 
action regulating the speech.128 In Kowalski, the Court found that the 
nexus requirement could be met by the material or substantial 
disruption test because although the MySpace page was created at 
home, the student “knew that the electronic response would be, as it 
in fact was, published beyond her home and could reasonably be 
expected to reach the school or impact the school environment.”129 
Although acknowledging that there is “a limit to the scope of a high 
school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students 
when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse gate,” the 
Court declined to define that limit.130 It instead limited itself to 
finding that the student’s speech on the MySpace page had a 
sufficiently strong nexus to those pedagogical interests.131  
In sum, schools’ authority to regulate student speech is broader 
than that of other state actors and at times can extend beyond the 
physical boundaries of schools. Supreme Court cases indicate that 
schools can regulate student speech even if it occurs off-campus if it is 
school-sponsored speech or if it is drug-supporting speech made at a 
school-sponsored activity.132 In addition, in some Circuits, if there is a 
“reasonably foreseeable risk that the [speech will] come to the 
attention of school authorities” and create a material and substantial 
disruption in school,133 or if the regulation of the speech has a 
sufficiently strong nexus to a school’s pedagogical interests,134 then 
student speech may be regulated by schools regardless of where and 
when it occurs.  
2. If Increased School Authority to Regulate Student Speech Is a Guide, 
Cyberbullying Laws Expand School Authority 
Although the limits on school authority under student-speech 
cases provide a rough guide for the general limits on school authority, 
 
127. Id. The student additionally brought a challenge on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds. Id. 




132. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). 
133. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007). 
134. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573. 
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the surveillance authority of schools under cyberbullying statutes 
exceeds those limits. Because of its sweeping nature, the surveillance 
of all of students’ online and electronic activity whenever and 
wherever it occurs under cyberbullying statutes gathers information 
about students that has nothing to do with any foreseeable risk of a 
material or substantial disruption in school or any nexus to 
pedagogical interests.135 The surveillance authority instead allows 
schools to learn any information about students that is posted online 
or electronically regardless of whether it has to do with school at 
all.136 Accordingly, schools have the authority under the majority of 
cyberbullying statutes to obtain information about students regardless 
of its connection to school.137  
Of course, surveillance of students under cyberbullying statutes is 
distinct from the student-speech cases in one way. The student-speech 
cases focus on the regulation of student speech by means of school 
discipline.138 The surveillance of students under cyberbullying statutes 
happens before the student discipline takes place. In that sense, the 
First Amendment cases seem at least somewhat inapposite. No speech 
has yet been regulated. Yet the student-speech cases still suggest 
where school authority begins and ends and, therefore, give an 
indication of how much cyberbullying laws expand that authority by 
allowing schools to conduct surveillance of students well beyond the 
time and space of school. 
 
135. See supra Parts I.A, I.B.2, and I.B.3.  
136. Id.  
137. For a discussion of how a school could draft a cyberbullying policy that 
complies with First Amendment doctrine, see Goodno, supra note 4. 
138. E.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(noting how student was suspended for wearing armband); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (noting how student was suspended 
for sexual innuendo–filled speech); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260 (1988) (noting how student articles on pregnancy and 
divorce were excluded from school newspaper); Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393 (2007) (noting how student suspended for “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” 
banner at school assembly); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting how student suspended for “creating and trans-
mitting drawing depicting shooting of teacher”); Doninger v. Niehoff, 
642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting how student excluded from election 
for protest against rescheduling of “Jamfest” event); Kowalski v. 
Berkeley County. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting how 
student suspended for posting to a webpage ridiculing another student); 
S.J.W. v Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 773–74 (8th Cir. 
2012) (noting how students suspended for “creating website with blog 
containing variety of offensive, racist, and sexist comments about school 
and classmates”). 
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B. The Limits of School Authority Under Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
1. Schools’ Authority to Search Students in School 
Schools’ surveillance authority under the majority of 
cyberbullying statutes may seem something more akin to the 
authority to search students, which is subject to the limits of the 
Fourth Amendment. While, as with First Amendment doctrine, 
school surveillance authority does not fit neatly into current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, it is nonetheless instructive as to the general 
limits of school authority. Here too, the surveillance authority exceeds 
even the expanded search authority provided to schools under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The seminal case on schools’ authority to conduct student 
searches is New Jersey v. T.LO.139 In T.L.O., a school assistant vice 
principal conducted an in-school search of a female student’s purse on 
the suspicion that she was smoking in school, thus violating school 
rules.140 The search uncovered marijuana and related paraphernalia, 
and the girl subsequently faced delinquency charges.141 She sought to 
suppress the evidence of the search on Fourth Amendment grounds.142 
Finding that the Fourth Amendment’s “prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school 
officials,” the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the validity of the 
search.143 The Court held that, unlike in other contexts, school 
officials need neither a warrant nor probable cause to conduct a 
search of students in school.144 Rather, searches of students in school 
need only be reasonable, as determined through application of a two-
factor analysis.145 First, a court must “consider ‘whether 
the . . . action was justified from its inception.’”146 Second, a court has 
to assess whether “the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably 
 
139. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The lower federal courts have heard 
Fourth Amendment cases in which students challenged searches of their 
online activity. When they have been presented with such cases, the 
courts analyze them under the T.L.O. framework. E.g., R.S. v. 
Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Minn. 
2012) (assessing the search of a student’s Facebook and e-mail accounts 
after she involuntarily gave school officials her login information under 
the T.L.O. standard and finding the search to have violated that 
standard). 
140. T.L.O., 467 U.S. at 328.  
141. Id. at 328–29. 
142. Id. at 329. 
143. Id. at 333. 
144. Id. at 340–41. 
145. Id. at 341. 
146. Id. 
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related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 
in the first place.’”147 Finding the search of T.L.O. to meet both 
prongs of the test, the Court concluded that it met constitutional 
strictures.148  
Following T.L.O., the Supreme Court took up the question of 
whether schools could conduct suspicionless drug searches in Vernonia 
School District v. Acton.149 In Acton, the Court considered the claim 
of a student, James Acton, who wanted to sign up to play football 
but refused to consent to school-administered and school-required 
drug testing in order to do it.150 He challenged the drug-testing 
requirement on Fourth Amendment grounds.151 The Court again 
applied a reasonableness standard, but it did not use the two-part test 
from T.L.O.152 It upheld the drug testing program as reasonable 
because it found that (1) students have a reduced expectation of 
privacy in school and particularly in sports programs; (2) the requisite 
search was limited to drug testing (as opposed to also including things 
like pregnancy testing); and (3) testing is needed due to the 
widespread school drug problem and related discipline problems.153  
2. If Increased School Authority to Search Student Speech Is a Guide, 
Cyberbullying Laws Expand School Authority 
Although they do not precisely cover surveillance under 
cyberbullying laws, T.L.O. and Acton outline some of the limits on a 
school’s search authority. Both limit school searches to those that are 
reasonable. The broad sweep of schools’ surveillance authority under 
cyberbullying statutes, though, largely defies this standard. Take the 
two-factor test set forth in T.L.O. for determining reasonableness;154 
assuming school surveillance is a search, schools’ surveillance of 
student online and electronic activity fails that two-factor test. First, 
the school authority fails the requirement that a search be “justified 
at its inception.”155 The broad surveillance authority provided by the 
cyberbullying laws has no justification other than an undifferentiated 
understanding that cyberbullying does happen sometimes among some 
students. This vague rationale for conducting surveillance of all 
 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 345–47. 
149. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995). 
150. Id. at 651.  
151. Id. 
152. See id. at 652. 
153. Id. at 657–58, 661. 
154. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). 
155. Id.  
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students without any specific suspicion attached cannot be considered 
legitimate justification. Second, the surveillance authority under the 
cyberbullying laws cannot be deemed reasonably related in scope to 
the initial justification. As already noted, the surveillance authority 
can occur without anything but the most amorphous of justifications. 
In addition, the scope, which allows schools to monitor all students at 
all times, could not be broader. To justify this scope, schools would 
have to suspect that all students are engaged in cyberbullying at all 
times.156  
Similarly, the cyberbullying laws arguably fail to satisfy the 
metric for reasonableness articulated in Acton. Acton requires that in 
order for suspicionless, in-school student searches to be reasonable, 
they need to be limited in scope, among other things. Schools’ 
surveillance of students under cyberbullying laws, however, can 
uncover vast amounts of information communicated online and 
electronically by students—not just information on cyberbullying. As 
such, the surveillance arguably defies the strictures of limitedness that 
support a conclusion that a search is reasonable. 
That said, student search doctrine both in T.L.O. as well as in 
Acton still does not provide perfect guidance for interpreting the 
limits of school surveillance authority for at least three reasons. First, 
T.L.O. as well as Acton address searches that happen in school. In 
T.L.O., the suspected violation of school rules and the consequent 
search conducted by the assistant vice principal both happened in the 
school building.157 In Acton, the search of James Acton would have 
occurred in school had he consented to it.158 The Supreme Court did 
not then, and has not subsequently, addressed whether schools have 
any authority to search students outside the time and space of the 
physical school setting or any limits thereof. Because surveillance 
under cyberbullying laws happens outside school, whether and how 
the Fourth Amendment doctrine under T.L.O. and Acton applies is 
an open question.  
Second, Fourth Amendment doctrine on searches is invoked in 
order to suppress the evidence of the search when discipline (or 
prosecution) is imposed, or when other benefits or privileges are 
denied because of searches.159 The school surveillance of students’ 
 
156. See id. at 341. For a discussion of how schools could have the authority 
to search students’ electronic devices upon suspicion that cyberbullying 
was occurring in school during school hours, see Goodno, supra note 4. 
157. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
158. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995). 
159. Students may be entitled to some redress for Fourth Amendment 
violations without harm, but the damages they can recover would likely 
be only nominal. See G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 634 
(6th Cir. 2013).  
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online activity and the searches in T.L.O. and Acton either resulted 
in the discipline or the prosecution of a student, as in T.L.O., or were 
limited to when a student had volunteered for specific school 
activities, as in Acton.160 Electronic surveillance under cyberbullying 
laws can happen without any consequent discipline, prosecution, or 
denial of benefits or privileges. Whether the Fourth Amendment 
would provide redress for student surveillance without actual 
discipline or denial of privileges, then, is also an open question.161 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment doctrine under T.L.O. and Acton 
does not provide precise bounds for the limits of school surveillance of 
students’ online and electronic activity.162 
Third, in order for the Fourth Amendment to be implicated, 
students must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object 
of the search.163 Whether students have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in many online and electronic communications is at best 
questionable.164 Frequently used online tools and services like Google 
make clear that users’ expectation of privacy in their searches and 
posts is limited.165 
Despite these limitations on T.L.O. and Acton as guidelines for 
the confines of school surveillance authority, they nonetheless 
demonstrate, more generally, some of the bounds on school authority. 
Like student-speech cases, they offer insight into the outer limits of 
the authority of schools to search student in school and impose 
consequences as a result. Notwithstanding that school surveillance 
under cyberbullying laws occurs outside school (as well as inside) and 
potentially without the consequences of prosecution or the denial of 
privileges, it exceeds the kinds of limits set by the Fourth 
Amendment. It allows for the unjustified collection of potentially vast 
amounts of information communicated by students electronically at 
 
160. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 650. 
161. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013) (failing 
to reach the issue of whether surveillance alone would be actionable 
under the Fourth Amendment as the plaintiffs could not point to a 
substantiated instance of government surveillance). 
162. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329 (determining whether the search in question 
was unreasonable for the purpose of suppressing uncovered evidence in 
the subsequent delinquency charges). 
163. Id. at 337. 
164. Thanks to Marc Weber, Founder and Curator of the Internet History 
Program at the Computer History Museum, for bringing this salient 
point to the Author’s attention. 
165. Conor Dougherty, Google Gives Child Pornography Evidence to Police, 
The Bus. of Tech. Blog, N.Y. Times (Aug. 4, 2014, 9:41 PM), http:// 
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/google-gives-child-pornography-
email-evidence-to-police/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
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any time, thus demonstrating the expansion of school authority under 
cyberbullying laws far beyond the boundaries of school and the school 
day.  
C. School Surveillance Authority and the General Limits on 
Government Surveillance 
1.	 Government Surveillance Authority Generally 
Although doctrine on state surveillance authority has not 
addressed school surveillance authority, because the school is an arm 
of the state, this doctrine too is instructive. In 2012, the Supreme 
Court addressed state surveillance authority when it took up a 
challenge to § 1881a of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978166 in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.167 Section 1881a 
authorizes United States government surveillance of people who are 
not United States citizens and who are reasonably believed to be 
outside the United States.168 The plaintiffs in Clapper were attorneys 
as well as labor, media, and human rights organizations.169 They 
alleged that because they had reason to be in communication with 
people who could be under § 1881a surveillance, they too could be 
subject to surveillance by the government.170 As a result, they had 
“‘ceased engaging’ in certain telephone and e-mail communications” 
and had “undertaken ‘costly and burdensome measures’ to protect the 
confidentiality of sensitive communications.”171 Challenging § 1881a 
on Fourth and First Amendment grounds, they alleged “an 
objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications will be 
acquired” and that the “risk of surveillance . . . is so substantial that 
they have been forced to take costly and burdensome measures to 
protect the confidentiality of their international communications.”172 
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims on Article III 
standing grounds. The Court found the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries 
“highly speculative.”173 Specifically, the Court found that the 
plaintiffs’ speculative fears were that  
(1) the Government will decide to target the communications of 
non-U.S. persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, 
 
166. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (Supp. V 2006).  
167. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
168. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.  
169. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1145. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 1145–46. 
172. Id. at 1146. 
173. Id. at 1148. 
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the Government will choose to invoke its authority under 
§1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) 
the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court will conclude that the Government’s 
proposed surveillance procedures [will] satisfy §1881a’s many 
safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) 
the Government will succeed in intercepting the 
communications of [plaintiffs’] contacts; and (5) respondents will 
be parties to the particular communications that the 
Government intercepts.174 
Taking issue with the conjectural nature of the plaintiffs’ assertions 
of injury in Clapper, the Court identified factors that would have, if 
satisfied, arguably make the injuries real and present. Had the 
plaintiffs’ contacts been government targets, and the government 
then conducted surveillance on them with the blessing of the FISA 
Court, the plaintiffs would have had greater success establishing their 
injury.175 Had they also been able to show that the surveillance of 
their contacts was successful and occurred while the plaintiffs were 
parties to those communications, then the plaintiffs likely would have 
succeeded in showing an injury that satisfied Article III standing 
requirements.176  
2.	 How the Cyberbullying Laws Exceed or Nearly Exceed Limits 
on Government Surveillance Authority 
While not a school surveillance case, Clapper offers some possible 
insight regarding limits on state and, therefore, school surveillance 
authority more generally. The fact that school surveillance authority 
under the cyberbullying statutes, in at least some states, could meet 
the requirements for showing an injury under Clapper is suggestive of 
the breadth of schools’ authority. In Clapper, the Court first took 
issue with the fact that the plaintiffs may not have been subjected to 
surveillance at all, making their claims of injury speculative.177 Unlike 
the plaintiffs in Clapper, however, students are quite clearly the 
targets of surveillance in states where schools have unlimited or nearly 
unlimited authority to monitor their online and electronic activity. 
Moreover, the students are in fact being monitored through the use of 
comprehensive monitoring systems offered by companies like Geo 
Listening and CompuGuardian.  
 
174. Id.  
175. See id. (finding no injury due in part to the plaintiffs’ inability to 
substantiate their argument that they themselves were the target of any 
actual government surveillance).  
176. See id.  
177. Id. 
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Similarly, unlike the plaintiffs in Clapper, students in those 
schools and school districts have an argument that the surveillance 
authority granted under the cyberbullying laws fails to satisfy existing 
safeguards under the Fourth Amendment for the reasons articulated 
in Part II.B.2 of this Article. As already discussed, whether students 
would succeed in this argument is still an open question; however, 
that the argument even exists demonstrates the breadth of school 
surveillance authority.  
Finally, students in schools and school districts using the services 
and products of companies like Geo Listening and CompuGuardian 
could show that surveillance is effectively used to intercept their 
particular communication. The companies that provide services and 
products to allow schools to conduct surveillance boast of their 
effectiveness at intercepting students’ online and electronic 
information, indicating their success at the interception of the 
communications.178 In sum, the surveillance authority under 
cyberbullying statutes in these schools and school districts pushes the 
boundaries of even the federal government’s limits on surveillance 
authority as it arguably comes close to creating an injury or injuries—
especially to the extent that students change their behavior or incur 
costs to avoid monitoring. 
Students attending schools and school districts that have yet to 
use all the authority provided under the cyberbullying laws to 
conduct comprehensive monitoring would be less able to meet the 
elements set forth in Clapper. But the schools need only decide to pay 
money to a company like Geo Listening or CompuGuardian, and 
students would likely be able to overcome the problems that stymied 
the plaintiffs in Clapper. Thus, even in those schools and school 
districts, the surveillance authority under the cyberbullying statutes 
nearly exceeds general limits on government surveillance. 
Although no doctrinal limits exist for school surveillance authority 
under cyberbullying laws, First and Fourth Amendment student-
speech and search doctrines as well as the doctrine on general 
government surveillance provides a general outline for when and 
where students are subject to school authority and the extent of that 
authority. By allowing schools in most states to conduct surveillance 
of students whenever and wherever they are, cyberbullying laws run 
roughshod over these kinds of doctrinal limits—failing to take them as 
any kind of guide regarding how far school surveillance authority can 
legitimately reach. These statutes create a world where everywhere is 
“in school” and therefore vastly expand the reach of school authority. 
If that were all the cyberbullying laws did, the expansion of school 
 
178. Wallace, supra note 16 (quoting the President of Safe Outlook 
Corporation as proclaiming the amount of information his product can 
collect that can help schools discipline students for online behavior). 
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authority might be justified in the name of more effectively halting 
cyberbullying. Yet the statutes do not stop there. They also implicate 
affirmative privacy harms. 
III. Privacy Harms, More Acute in School 
While the clearest harm to students from the school surveillance 
authority may be the discipline that follows, students are also subject 
to privacy harms—simply through the act of surveillance alone.179 
Litigants challenging government surveillance absent prosecution or 
other obvious injury have not been particularly successful.180 Courts 
have instead tended to find that “mere surveillance creates no 
harms.”181 In response, surveillance and privacy scholars have devoted 
energy to identifying the harms associated with broad public and 
private surveillance on its own. These scholars have made compelling 
cases. In doing so, they have drawn on the First and Fourth 
Amendments to articulate the particular kinds, or the nature, of 
privacy that surveillance invades. These kinds of privacy also are 
affected by school surveillance under the cyberbullying laws. 
Furthermore, these identified privacy harms are also more acute 
because the school is the state actor in question, and students are the 
subject of the surveillance authority.  
A. The Kinds of Privacy Implicated 
Before discussing the privacy harms implicated by the 
unprecedented surveillance authority granted schools by way of the 
cyberbullying laws, a discussion of the nature of privacy associated 
with that surveillance authority is warranted. As the Supreme Court 
has stated, the nature of the privacy right implicated in any 
particular case is significant because the Constitution “does not 
protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but only those that 
society recognizes as ‘legitimate.’”182 Privacy and surveillance studies 
scholars have discussed two kinds of privacy that are relevant in the 
school surveillance context: intellectual privacy183 and quantitative 
privacy.184  
 
179. See the example cited at the end of Part I.B.3. 
180. E.g., Richards, supra note 19, at 1934; Citron & Gray, supra note 19, at 
272; Solove, supra note 19, at 498. 
181. Richards, supra note 19. 
182. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995). 
183. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387 (2008). 
184. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 
Minn. L. Rev 62 (2013). 
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1. Intellectual Privacy 
Professor Neil Richards has articulated the concept of intellectual 
privacy.185 In essence, the theory of intellectual privacy is about the 
ability to develop ideas on one’s own.186 While Richards conceives of 
intellectual privacy as “a series of nested protections,” the core is 
about the ability to consider, weigh, and think through one’s own 
beliefs and thoughts.187 More specifically, Richards defines intellectual 
privacy as “the ability, whether protected by law or social 
circumstances, to develop ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted 
gaze or interference of others.”188  
Richards conceives of intellectual privacy as having four 
elements.189 The first and “core” element of intellectual privacy “is the 
freedom of thought and belief.”190 It covers all the thoughts and beliefs 
an individual has.191 Spatial privacy is the second element, and it 
“refers to the protection of places—physical, social, or otherwise—
against intrusion or surveillance.”192 It is an integral component to 
intellectual privacy because people need these spaces free of 
interference in order to develop their thoughts and beliefs.193 The third 
element of intellectual privacy is the freedom of intellectual 
exploration.194 This right protects the ability to develop new ideas and 
all the processes involved in doing so.195 Finally, the fourth element of 
intellectual privacy is confidential communications.196 As Richards 
explains, “[c]onfidentiality protects the relationships in which 
information is shared, allowing candid discussion away from the 
prying ears of others.”197 It protects information from disclosure to or 
by third parties.198 
 
185. See Richards, supra note 19; Richards, supra note 183. 
186. Richards, supra note 183, at 389. 
187. Id. at 408. 
188. Id. at 389. 
189. Id. at 392. 
190. Id. at 408. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 412.  
193. Id. at 413.  
194. Id. at 416.  
195. Id.  
196. Id. at 421.  
197. Id.  
198. Id. at 422.  
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When schools have the authority to conduct surveillance of 
students, the intellectual privacy of students is squarely impacted. 
Each element of intellectual privacy is affected. Students’ freedom of 
thought and belief is infringed because cyberbullying laws give schools 
access to almost any thoughts and beliefs students express 
electronically, regardless of whether they have anything to do with 
cyberbullying. If a student expresses a private thought about the 
quality of a school research assignment electronically, the school 
would potentially have access to those thoughts. If a student 
expresses frustration with her parents’ imposition of a curfew online, 
the school would potentially have access to that information as well.  
Schools also have access to the electronic spaces in which students 
express themselves under the cyberbullying laws, and thus they 
encroach on their students’ spatial privacy. The companies that 
collect students’ online data go to these spaces—sometimes public and 
sometimes private—to obtain the data. They even look to the spaces 
of the students’ keystrokes when collecting students’ electronic 
information.199  
To the extent students use those spaces to develop ideas, the 
school can invade students’ freedom of intellectual exploration. 
Consider the student who questions a teacher’s interpretation of a 
particular piece of literature. If a student expresses that idea online, 
the school would have access to it. Surely not all students are using 
their time online to express high-minded thoughts, but even less 
academic expressions of thought fall under the category of intellectual 
exploration. Even social communication about cliques and romantic 
alliances falls into the category of intellectual exploration for a 
teenager who is learning to navigate an increasingly complex social 
system as she matures. Thus, for students in the majority of states, 
the cyberbullying laws allow their schools to intrude upon this 
intellectual exploration. 
When any electronic or online communication is made—at least in 
twenty-five or arguably thirty-two states—the confidentiality of the 
communication is gone. If a student communicates electronically to a 
friend, makes a comment on a blog, or posts on social media, most 
schools would have the authority to access these communications. 
Thus, the students’ abilities to communicate confidentially online is 
significantly reduced. While it is true that this reduction in 
confidentiality could be somewhat counteracted if students tightened 
privacy settings on social media sites and applications, this solution is 
only partial at best. Students would have to be conscientious enough 
to monitor their privacy settings often so when the privacy policies of 
 
199. Wallace, supra note 16.  
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the companies offering the applications and social media change, the 
students could reassess the scope of their privacy settings.200  
As a result of these invasions, students’ intellectual privacy is 
curtailed as a whole when exercised electronically. Given that 95 
percent of teens are online, the number of students potentially 
affected by this curtailment can reasonably be called significant.201 
Surveillance of their intellectual activities and the invasion of their 
intellectual privacy runs counter to even their relatively limited in-
school First Amendment freedoms. Also, as will be discussed in Part 
III.B, the potential these invasions have for undermining the 
creativity of students’ thoughts and intellectual pursuits runs contrary 
to the purpose of school.  
2. Quantitative Privacy 
Professors Danielle Keats Citron and David Gray have expounded 
the concept of quantitative privacy, which focuses on how, how much, 
and how frequently surveillance and data collection occur.202 They 
argue that what is troubling about data collection is how broad and 
indiscriminate it is.203 Such collection, they posit, “intrudes upon 
reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy by raising the specter 
of a surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is left 
to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement or other government 
agents.”204 In the context of the Fourth Amendment, Citron and Gray 
contend that if quantitative privacy rights are implicated, the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard must come to bear on the 
search.205  
Cyberbullying laws impinge on quantitative privacy.206 They allow 
for the broad, indiscriminate collection of data by the state because 
they allow for schools to collect virtually any online or electronic data 
of any student in the name of ferretting out cyberbullying.207 Because 
the school is no less an arm of the state than law enforcement, school 
 
200. Facebook, for example, is notorious for regularly changing its privacy 
policies without ample and obvious disclosure to users. See, e.g., Brian 
Fung, Your Facebook Privacy Settings Are About to Change. Again. 
Wash. Post, Apr. 8, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/04/08/your-facebook-privacy-settings-
are-about-to-change-again/.  
201. Madden et al., supra note 72.  
202. Gray & Citron, supra note 184.  
203. Id. at 73–82. 
204. Id. at 72. 
205. Id.  
206. See supra Part I.B.2, Part I.B.3. 
207. Id. 
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surveillance authority is state surveillance authority in all the states 
with cyberbullying laws. In most states, the state, by way of the 
schools, has the authority to hire companies to conduct electronic 
dragnets. There is virtually no limit on the ways the schools in those 
states (or the companies they hire) can collect data or the amount of 
data they collect. As previously noted, none of the information may 
actually be related to cyberbullying or school. Even in the fourteen 
activity nexus states, the surveillance authority is still broad and 
indiscriminate because the laws allow schools to conduct surveillance 
of all student online activity without limit as long as students are in 
school or at school-related activities. In these states, schools can 
collect data on students by virtually any means and in any quantity 
as long as they do so while the students are in school or doing 
something like riding a school bus or waiting at a school bus stop.  
This broad surveillance authority also infringes on students’ 
quantitative privacy because schools have unfettered use of the data 
collected. 208 While the cyberbullying laws authorize or require schools 
to discipline students when they discover cyberbullying, they are 
silent as to what the schools can do with any other information they 
learn. The schools, therefore, have no guidance as to whether or how 
to use the other information gathered through their electronic 
surveillance of students. As a result, the schools could choose to 
ignore any such information, use it to benefit the students, or use it in 
ways that harm the students.  
B. How the Fact of School Surveillance Authority 
Exacerbates Privacy Harms  
Perhaps the intrusion into students’ intellectual and quantitative 
privacy could be argued acceptable in the name of derailing 
cyberbullying and particularly its potential for tragic outcomes.209 An 
argument exists that schools need this broadly expanded authority. 
Otherwise, cyberbullying—hard to catch and potentially devastating 
in its effects—may continue to go unaddressed and unabated. What 
entity better than schools to address the cyberbullying among 
students? Students attend schools mandatorily,210 and they are there 
 
208. See N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (finding school officials acted 
reasonably when they searched a student’s bag and found evidence that 
was subsequently used against the student in a delinquency hearing). 
209. The Sheriff investigating Rebecca Ann Sedwick’s death said she was 
“absolutely terrorized on social media.” Other girls taunted her and 
urged her to kill herself. Alvarez, supra note 9, at A1, A3. At least four 
student suicides in California are tied to online bullying. Thomas & 
Murphy, supra note 2. 
210. Every state has a mandatory school attendance law. See Institute of 
Education Sciences, State Education Reforms, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. 
Statistics, at tbl.5.1, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereform/tab5_ 
1.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) (providing the age of required school 
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for six or more hours per day.211 Moreover, cyberbullying does happen 
among students.212 Accordingly, it makes more than a little sense that 
the schools should have some responsibility for stopping cyberbullying 
when it happens. However, the laws do more than broadly expand 
school authority to unprecedented degrees, resulting in general 
infringements on students’ intellectual and quantitative privacy. They 
also impose specific privacy harms that are made more acute because 
of the school setting. Three privacy harms that have been identified 
by privacy and surveillance studies scholars in other contexts are not 
only relevant in the school context but are also intensified by it. In an 
effort to address a real problem, then, the cyberbullying laws create 
new ones.213 
1. Civil Liberties Harms 
Surveillance infringing on intellectual privacy, quantitative 
privacy, or both creates civil liberties harms in the form of squelching 
the development of ideas or causing self-censorship after those ideas 
have formed.214 As Neil Richards persuasively argues, without the 
freedom to develop ideas, the ideas may not develop at all. When 
people fear being watched, they think and act differently.215 
Surveillance then can serve as a form of social thought control.216 It 
can lead to the suppression or failure to formulate creative, new 
ideas.217 What is more, even if surveillance does not suppress new 
ideas, it can cause individuals to self-censor extant ideas so they do 
 
attendance under each state’s compulsory school attendance laws as of 
2013). 
211. The average length of a public school day in the United States is 6.7 
hours. Institute of Education Sciences, Average Length of School Day in 
Hours for Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, by Level or School 
and State: 2007–08, Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces. 
ed.gov/surveys/AnnualReports/data/xls/daylength0708.xls (last visited 
June 25, 2014). In some states, students spend more than 1,000 hours of 
instructional time in school per year. Thomas D. Snyder & Sally A. 
Dillow, Digest of Education Statistics 2011, Nat’l Ctr. on Educ. 
Statistics 253 (June 2012), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012001.pdf.  
212. To cite just two examples, the events prompting California to pass one 
of the first cyberbullying laws occurred between students as did the 
bullying events leading up to Rebecca Ann Sedwick’s suicide in 2013. 
Alvarez, supra note 9; Thomas & Murphy, supra note 2. 
213. Additionally, they do so without really addressing the causes and effects 
of bullying. See infra Part III.  
214. Richards, supra note 19, at 1948–49.  
215. Id. at 1948; Solove, supra note 19, at 494–95. 
216. Solove, supra note 19, at 494. 
217. Richards, supra note 19, at 1948.  
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not get expressed.218 Surveillance makes people “extremely 
uncomfortable.”219 Simply put, innovative ideas or ideas that may be 
perceived as controversial are harder to express in an atmosphere of 
discomfort.220  
It is for this reason, among others, that Richards calls for the 
protection of intellectual privacy. Richards argues that without its 
protection, individuals cannot develop the ideas and beliefs necessary 
to exercise their First Amendment rights.221 Freedom of speech lacks 
meaning if individuals cannot engage in the processes necessary or 
have the space necessary to develop their own thoughts and ideas to 
then exercise their First Amendment rights.222 Whether new or extant, 
if ideas cannot be developed or expressed, as Richards notes, the First 
Amendment protections lose substantial significance.223 Freedom of 
speech and expression mean little when individuals cannot develop 
the ideas in the first place or fear sharing them with others.  
When schools can conduct broad surveillance of students, 
students face these civil liberties harms. The only difference between 
students facing these harms and individuals in the public facing them 
more generally is that for students the harms are more acute because 
the school holds the authority. The harms are more acute because 
they stand in direct opposition to the purpose of school. Schools’ 
function is to educate “the young for citizenship.”224 This means that 
schools serve to “[inculcate] ‘fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of the democratic political system.’”225 Indeed, 
educational philosopher and reformer John Dewey considered 
education to be an integral part of the right to vote.226  
Yet when schools have the authority to conduct broad, 
comprehensive surveillance of students, students suffer civil liberties 
harms and fail to learn the values necessary for participation in 
democracy. Surveillance can have a chilling effect on their willingness 
to articulate ideas, particularly because students are increasingly 
using electronic means to communicate their ideas and thoughts as 
 
218. Id. at 1949.  
219. Solove, supra note 19, at 493. 
220. Id. 
221. Richards, supra note 183, at 389.  
222. Richards, supra note 19, at 1946–47.  
223. Richards, supra note 183, at 389.  
224. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
225. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 406 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting 
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)). 
226. Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved 
Challenge: Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1015, 1034 (2008).  
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compared with in-person or phone communication.227 If their ability to 
develop new ideas is compromised, they cannot reasonably learn how 
to become engaged members of a democracy, where ideas are the 
bedrock of discourse and the informed vote.228 School authority to 
conduct broad, comprehensive surveillance, then, suppresses rather 
than imbues the values of citizenship and democracy in students.  
Of course, one purpose of any cyberbullying law and any 
attendant surveillance authority is to prevent students from engaging 
in cyberbullying by not only rooting it out but also preventing it—
quelling the speech before it happens. Yet, broad surveillance of 
students has the potential to do much more than quiet cyberbullying. 
It can stifle a much broader array of speech, teaching students to not 
participate in the intellectual exchanges that form the basis for 
democratic participation.  
2. Imbalance in the State–Citizen Power Relationship 
Another harm of surveillance is a change in the “power dynamic 
between the watcher and the watched” with the increase in power 
going to the watcher.229 Neil Richards as well as Professor Daniel 
Solove both effectively contend that this change in the power dynamic 
between the state and citizens can result in harms such as 
discrimination and blackmail.230 Surveillance is a tool of power.231 
 
227. A 2012 Pew Research study found that 63 percent of teens communicate 
by text message daily while only 39 percent and 35 percent 
communicate over cell phones or in person, respectively. Amanda 
Lenhart, Texting Dominates Teens’ General Communication Choices, Pew 
Research Internet Project (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.pew 
internet.org/2012/03/19/communication-choices/. Although it can be 
argued that applications such as Snapchat, which create ephemeral 
messages that disappear after being read, reduce or eliminate any 
chilling effect, that argument fails to consider that even Snapchat 
messages can be saved by either the sender or the receiver. Snapchat 
Guide for Parents, supra note 43, at 6.  
228. While it may be that much of students’ online and electronic 
communications have much less to do with high-minded democratic 
debate and more to do with clothes, student romance, and the like, that 
does not mean that students do not engage in debates that are 
meaningful and foster their participation in the democracy. For 
example, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the student in question engaged in a 
debate online about a school official’s decision to move the date or 
location of a student event. Though perhaps done in an inappropriate 
way, the debate about whether this could be done was ultimately one 
about school authority and student rights. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 
334, 339–41 (2d Cir. 2011). 
229. Richards, supra note 19, at 1953. 
230. Id. at 1935; Solove, supra note 19, at 540–41. 
231. Richards, supra note 19, at 1952–53; Solove, supra note 19, at 493.  
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When the power is increased such that the watcher has the tools to 
categorize people, the power can “bleed imperceptibly into the power 
of discrimination.”232 While not all discrimination is bad, surveillance 
allows the unfettered ability to classify people by type, which can lead 
to unwanted or unlawful discrimination.  
This change in the power dynamic also can lead to blackmail.233 
The sheer amount of data that can potentially be collected through 
surveillance can lead to the revelation of individuals’ secrets.234 This 
information can easily be used against watched individuals for the 
gain of the watcher.235  
In the school setting where the school is the watcher and the 
students are the watched, these harms are intensified for at least two 
reasons. First, schools already hold a larger proportion of power over 
students than does the state generally in the state–citizen 
relationship.236 Schools have increased authority to infringe on 
students’ First Amendment rights as well as their Fourth Amendment 
rights, and they have limited liability when they do cause students 
harm.237 Coupling this already-extant power imbalance with the 
amount of information that schools can obtain on students via 
surveillance authority under the cyberbullying laws only intensifies 
the power imbalance.  
Second, schools have a recurring history of engaging in 
discrimination, and students are particularly vulnerable to its harms. 
The ongoing series of school segregation cases attest that schools are 
not strangers to discrimination.238 As burgeoning members of the 
adult social and economic spheres, students depend on schools to help 
them enter and navigate those worlds. Discrimination or blackmail 
can hamper or even destroy students’ abilities to reach their potential 
in these arenas. This result could happen in myriad ways. Schools 
could discriminate against students based on surveillance in large or 
small forms, such as by determining who gets into honors classes 
based on surveillance data, thus potentially affecting students’ college 
 
232. Richards, supra note 19, at 1957.  
233. Id. at 1953. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. (citing, by example, the use of information gained from FBI wiretaps 
of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to later blackmail him). 
236. Supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
237. Id.; see also infra note 238 and accompanying text.  
238. The most famous of these cases involved racial segregation and occurred 
decades ago. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). However, desegregation cases continue 
today. E.g., Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 678 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
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admissions. Similarly, surveillance information could be used to 
blackmail students by incorporating it into a threat to withhold 
school services. Failure to receive school services, such as effective 
guidance services, could lead to problems getting jobs or into college 
after graduation. Of course, to be fair, the schools do have to control 
student behavior as reflected in any school discipline code. However, 
the maintenance of discipline in school is distinct from the use of vast 
amounts of data to control students’ behavior, especially through 
means such as discrimination or blackmail.  
3. Incorrect Data 
Finally, surveillance can cause harms when the data collected are 
incorrect or incorrectly interpreted. Professors Citron and Gray point 
out examples of the problems that result from incorrect or incorrectly 
interpreted data.239 These harms include employers’ not hiring 
individuals based on erroneous data and the incorrect identification of 
individuals as potential terrorists or security threats.240  
In school, the problem of incorrect or incorrectly interpreted data 
is as challenging or more so. As previously noted, the authority 
schools have over students’ lives and futures is significant. It includes, 
on the low end of the spectrum, control over which activities, classes, 
and electives students participate in. These all may have an impact 
on students’ futures since college admissions offices consider all of 
those factors in their decision making. This problem also spans to 
more direct control over students’ ability to get into college or find 
work after high school because they need recommendations and 
assistance from school staff to be considered for admission or 
employment. To the extent that school staff are insufficiently helpful 
in these endeavors because of incorrect or incorrectly interpreted data 
gained from school surveillance of student online and electronic 
activity (as opposed to out of a desire to discriminate or blackmail 
students), the impact can be large and long lasting. 
The harms derived from incorrect or incorrectly interpreted data 
as well as the civil liberties harms and harms from the increased 
imbalance in the state–citizen or school–student power dynamic are 
also exacerbated by the fact that students cannot avoid them. 
Students are required to attend school because every state has a 
mandatory attendance law.241 Therefore, when a state has the 
authority to conduct broad surveillance of students, escaping the 
surveillance and its harms is nearly impossible.  
In addition, when these harms occur, schools have almost no 
liability. As already noted earlier, no cyberbullying statute has a 
 
239. Gray & Citron, supra note 184, at 80–81.  
240. Id.  
241. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates 
110 
cause of action. Indeed, fourteen states’ cyberbullying laws expressly 
provide schools with immunity from liability under cyberbullying laws 
or deny any cause of action under them.242 North Dakota’s bullying 
legislation, for example, states that it does “not create or alter any 
civil cause of action.”243 Similarly, schools have very limited tort 
liability.244 While schools have been held responsible for causing 
physical harm to students, these have only been in extreme cases.245 
The federal appellate courts have not held schools responsible for the 
imposition of severe emotional harm on students.246 As a result, 
students who suffer privacy harms related to school surveillance have 
little to no recourse.  
IV. Moving Forward: Limiting School Surveillance 
Authority and Protecting Students 
from Privacy Harms  
The cyberbullying laws, for all the good intentions that underlie 
their passage, have not only vastly expanded school authority but 
have also created a new set of problems for students in the form of 
privacy harms.247 Accordingly, while they are a well-meaning start to 
addressing the challenging, painful problem of cyberbullying, the laws 
need to be changed in two ways to limit school surveillance authority 
and any attendant privacy harms. This Part proposes these two 
 
242. Alaska Stat. § 14.33.230 (2012); Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-514(g) 
(2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 4112D(e) (2011); Fla. Stat. 
§ 1006.147(6) (West 2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-751.4(e) (2012); 
Iowa Code § 280.28(5) (2011); Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-424(4) 
(2012); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37O(i) (West 2013); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 388.137 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 193-F:7, 
F:9 (2011); N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-19-2193 (2013); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 3313.667(c) (LexisNexis 2009); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 339.362(3), 
339.364 (West 2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-4505(c) (2013). 
243. N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-19-22 (2013). 
244. Immunity from tort liability still exists in a number of states. See Mark 
C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1079, 1145 (2002).  
245. See id.; see generally Emily F. Suski, Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom: 
The Failure of the Courts to Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional 
Harm as Unconstitutional, 62 Clev. St. L. Rev. 125 (2014) (analyzing 
why students’ substantive due process claims have only succeeded in the 
federal courts of appeals in cases of extreme physical pain, such as when 
students have been hit by school officials, but not emotional harm, such 
as when school officials have caused post-traumatic stress disorder and 
suicidal ideation).  
246. See Suski, supra note 245, at 128 (“No federal court of appeals, however, 
has found a student’s severe emotional harm alone unconstitutional.”).  
247. See supra Part III. 
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changes. Specifically, it calls for a framework for limiting schools’ 
surveillance authority and for the addition of a cause of action to the 
laws so students may seek recourse when schools exceed that 
authority. A framework for determining the boundaries of school 
surveillance authority is necessary because while schools do need some 
authority to monitor students’ online activity beyond the school 
setting, they do not need as much authority as they currently have, 
particularly because of the imposed privacy harms.248 They need the 
ability to intervene outside the physical school building in some 
instances because they are the natural arbiters of disputes between 
students when those problems impact school. When and how far 
beyond the school setting and into places like a student’s bedroom 
that school authority should reach, though, is another matter. A 
meaningful framework can set the limits for this authority. 
A cause of action in the cyberbullying laws is also necessary 
because students need a mechanism to enforce any such limits on 
schools’ surveillance authority. As just discussed, the cyberbullying 
laws do not provide students with any means for recourse when the 
schools exceed what limits may exist on their surveillance authority 
and impose privacy harms. This change also will help limit school 
authority and the attendant privacy harms created by the 
cyberbullying laws by providing a means for controlling school 
authority and redressing privacy harms. 
A. Limiting Schools’ Surveillance Authority: 
The Nexus Standard Works and Why It Works 
Limiting the broad expansion of school authority under the 
cyberbullying statutes and the attendant privacy harms requires a 
framework for determining the outer limits of school authority beyond 
the physical school setting. Part II explains how cyberbullying laws 
expand school authority. That only takes the matter so far, though. It 
explains why the cyberbullying laws now are too broad but does not 
provide a framework for evaluating how far school surveillance 
authority should be allowed to go beyond the physical setting of the 
school. 
The nexus framework articulated by the Fourth Circuit in 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, while developed in the context 
of a First Amendment analysis, provides a useful starting point for 
evaluating how far school surveillance authority should extend more 
 
248. Schools already do a fair amount of surveillance on students while they 
are in school in ways other than by monitoring their online and 
electronic activity, such as “having law enforcement present on campus, 
controlling access to school grounds by locking or monitoring gates, and 
installing security cameras.” Jason P. Nance, School Surveillance and 
the Fourth Amendment, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 79, 82 (2014). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates 
112 
generally.249 In Kowalksi, the Court required a sufficient nexus 
between the school’s pedagogical interests and the student’s actions to 
justify the discipline.250 This nexus standard provides a helpful 
framework for the evaluation of school surveillance authority for at 
least two reasons. First, it necessarily limits the school authority to 
instances in which the school has a substantial interest in and 
relationship to a student’s actions as they occur. Second, some of the 
cyberbullying statutes already require a substantial nexus to school 
before triggering the school authority to monitor or discipline 
students’ online or electronic activity.251 They therefore offer at least a 
partial way forward for the rest—the bulk—of cyberbullying laws: 
providing an applicable framework that can serve the purpose of 
curbing cyberbullying while keeping school authority within 
reasonable limits and protecting students’ from school-imposed 
privacy harms. 
To accomplish this, the nexus requirement must be specifically 
and explicitly tied to the authority to conduct surveillance of 
students, as distinct from a school’s ability to discipline a student for 
cyberbullying when it happens. More precisely, a school’s ability to 
conduct surveillance should be tied to location and subject to the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. While in 
Kowalski the Court declined to address the “metaphysical question” 
of where Internet conduct occurs, the question nonetheless must be 
addressed in order to adequately determine the breadth and limits of 
school surveillance authority.252  
Indeed, the metaphysical question of where school boundaries 
start and end in the context of school surveillance authority is not 
that thorny when it is tied to location, and more specifically the 
location of students who either send or receive cyberbullying 
messages. Consider, for example, an alternative: using time as the 
metric for determining the boundaries of school surveillance authority. 
That nexus might link school authority to times when students are 
doing school-related activities. However, students could be engaged in 
school-related activity at any time. They could arguably be engaged 
in school-related activities at home while doing homework in their 
bedrooms. If school surveillance authority were so limited under the 
cyberbullying statutes, it would either amount to a complete limit or 
not much of a limit at all. Not knowing when students engage in 
school-related activities could leave schools in a position where they 
never monitor students’ online activity unless students are in school 
 
249. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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because that is the only time they are surely engaged in school or 
school-related activities. Alternatively, it could also provide schools 
with the argument that they can conduct surveillance at almost any 
time since they have no way to know when students were engaged in 
online or electronic school-related activity. Thus, time offers an 
unworkable metric.  
Location of the students provides a better, simpler limit on school 
surveillance authority. If surveillance power is tied to student 
location, then a meaningful limit is imposed on that authority. To 
flesh this nexus out further and more explicitly, the cyberbullying 
laws should only allow schools to conduct surveillance of students’ 
online and electronic activity if students are at school or a school-
sponsored activity. The latter should be defined broadly to include 
when students are on school vehicles, at school bus stops, or at 
school-sponsored events. The question that then arises is how schools 
would know whether students are at school or school-sponsored 
events. The old-fashioned methods of taking attendance would suffice 
for many, if not most, activities. However, it would not suffice for all. 
Football games, for example, are school-sponsored activities that 
typically do not involve attendance-taking. Yet even at these kinds of 
events, schools have at their disposal metal detectors, cameras, and 
other means of knowing which students are or are not at the events.253 
While one could very reasonably quibble with whether this level of 
essentially on-campus surveillance should occur, it does occur and 
courts have upheld schools’ use of these methods.254 Thus schools can 
use this technology to know whether students are at such school-
sponsored events.  
This location nexus works to allow schools to gather information 
in the name of determining whether cyberbullying might be occurring, 
but it still limits it. Location-nexus restriction still allows for broad 
data collection, but it does not allow it wherever and whenever the 
data might be generated or received. Schools have a much better 
argument for broad data collection when students are at school or 
school-sponsored activities because they have that interest in learning 
of any threat to the “order, safety, and well-being of students”255 when 
they are in locations that render them essentially in school custody.256 
Location makes sense too in that the relationship between school 
surveillance authority and space defines what it means to be in 
school. Of course, the fact that this nexus is the nexus used by twelve 
 
253. Nance, supra note 248, at 96.  
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states serves to show that it does not so limit school authority to a 
place outside the mainstream.  
Surveillance of students at school or at school-sponsored activities 
will still potentially be broad in that it can involve more than a few 
students; therefore, the surveillance needs to be subject to the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard. As for the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness standard, as articulated in Part II, the cyberbullying 
laws arguably breach this standard to begin with. Why, then, is this 
standard not sufficient? First, it requires students to know when they 
are being monitored. For many students, they may not know. The 
authority, though being used for comprehensive monitoring in some 
places, is still inchoate in many others. Thus, the search may or may 
not occur. The privacy harms occur because of the potential for the 
search, but the search itself need never occur for the harm to be 
rendered. Thus, the reasonableness standard alone does not fully 
protect students or limit school authority to conduct surveillance of 
them.  
If a school, for example, has no cause to think cyberbullying may 
be happening in school or among students, then schools still should 
not be conducting surveillance of students. It would not meet the 
“justified at its inception” test required of student searches under 
T.L.O.257 And even if a school does have cause to believe 
cyberbullying is happening, the school should still limit the scope of 
surveillance to as few students as possible in order to meet the scope 
requirement of T.L.O.258  
Limiting schools’ access to their online and electronic activity in 
these ways will protect students from privacy harms. These limits will 
provide students with space free of the watchful eye of the schools to 
express themselves online and electronically and thereby decrease civil 
liberties harms. Also, these limits will help to provide more balance in 
the power relationship between the state, in the form of schools, and 
the citizen-students by limiting state authority over students. 
Additionally, by limiting the information the schools have, these 
limits address concerns about incorrect or incorrectly interpreted 
data.  
These limits on school surveillance authority also mean that that 
school may not catch some, even a lot, of cyberbullying through 
surveillance of students’ online and electronic activity. To the extent 
that cyberbullying messages are being sent and received when 
students are not in school or at school-sponsored activities, schools 
could not catch it through surveillance. This is not to suggest, 
though, that cyberbullying occurring outside school or school-
sponsored activities should not be caught or addressed. It does mean, 
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however, that it would not be revealed by means of school 
surveillance.259 Schools cannot be responsible for rooting out and 
addressing all cyberbullying whenever and wherever it happens. 
Parents and the rest of society have a responsibility to identify and 
address cyberbullying as well.  
It should also be noted that this nexus framework is distinct from 
any nexus to the school authority to discipline students. The nexus is 
about school surveillance. The task of this Article is not to address 
whether schools can discipline students for behavior like that in 
Kowalski, should they learn of its existence.260 The focus here is 
instead on limiting schools’ authority to conduct comprehensive, 
indiscriminate surveillance of students’ online and electronic activity 
anytime, anywhere.  
B. Why Not an Ownership Nexus or the First Amendment 
Foreseeable Disruption Standard 
One might wonder why ownership is not a sufficient nexus or the 
First Amendment foreseeable disruption standard is not offered as the 
standard for determining the bounds of school surveillance authority. 
After all, ownership of equipment seems to come implicitly with the 
right of control. Moreover, the First Amendment foreseeable 
disruption standard has for decades provided a means for determining 
when schools could, usually by way of student discipline, regulate 
student speech.261 The primary reason is that neither offers a 
meaningful limit on school surveillance authority.  
Ownership is not a sufficient nexus because it still allows schools 
to monitor all students’ online and electronic activity. With such a 
nexus, if students use schools’ equipment, then the schools could 
monitor all students’ online and electronic activity whenever and 
wherever it occurs.262 In that case, the limit on school surveillance 
authority is not much of a restriction, especially for the lower-income 
student.263 Rejecting an ownership nexus does not mean that schools 
cannot control their devices given to students. As noted above, they 
can and should be able to control their devices but do not need to 
 
259. Certainly, truly horrifying behavior such as threats to seriously harm 
students and videos of sexual assaults may not be caught by school 
surveillance. That does not mean such activity cannot be discovered and 
addressed through other legal avenues, such as criminal search and 
prosecution.  
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comprehensively monitor students’ online and electronic activity to do 
so.  
Under the foreseeable disruption doctrine, if the speech would 
“materially [disrupt] classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others,” then it could be regulated by the 
school.264 This standard provides little guidance for when schools can 
monitor student online and electronic activity. Any speech might 
materially disrupt the school no matter when or where it occurs. So 
using this standard would still arguably allow the schools to monitor 
students’ online and electronic activity no matter when or where it 
occurs because it might materially disrupt the school.  
C. A Cause of Action 
Because no cyberbullying statute has a cause of action, students 
have no clear recourse if schools exceed their authority under the 
cyberbullying statutes or impose privacy harms on them.265 This 
failure to provide students with a cause of action serves to further 
exacerbate the already-extant power imbalance imposed by the 
cyberbullying statutes.266 To better balance the power between 
student-citizens and the state in the form of schools, students need a 
cause of action so they can seek a remedy when they suffer privacy 
harms or schools exceed the authority granted under the cyber-
bullying laws. Cyberbullying laws, therefore, need to be revised to 
include both the location nexus proposed here and a cause of action 
for students should schools exceed it.  
In order to ensure that students really do have a remedy under 
cyberbullying laws for excessive surveillance or privacy harms, the 
cause of action needs to more than simply exist in the statutes or 
apply to instances when the schools exceed the authority granted 
them in the statues. The provisions in the laws must also explicitly 
state that students can seek remedies for harms such as quelled 
speech, discrimination, blackmail, or other adverse effects they may 
have suffered from broad, indiscriminate surveillance, or incorrect or 
incorrectly interpreted data.267 How a student might sue for quelled 
speech likely seems less obvious than how one would sue for blackmail 
and discrimination—as there are already ways to seek redress for 
blackmail and discrimination in other areas of law. One quelled speech 
claim a student could make, by way of example, is that the student’s 
 
264. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
265. See supra Part III.B.3. 
266. See supra Part III.B.1–2. 
267. To make the cause of action truly effective, of course, students will also 
need lawyers. While only the wealthier students could afford a lawyer to 
file a lawsuit, the benefits of such lawsuits would surely inure to the 
low-income students.  
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speech has become so limited due to the comprehensive surveillance 
by the school that the student has no electronic or online forums in 
which she can safely, without the watching eyes of the school, express 
her ideas. As a result, she can sue for both injunctive relief and 
damages for the loss of privacy and to ensure the school limits the 
surveillance so she does have electronic means of expressing herself 
without the school knowing about it.  
This proposal for a cause of action in cyberbullying statutes could 
be criticized on a couple of fronts. First, critics could argue that the 
Fourth Amendment provides a remedy, obviating the need for an 
additional statutory cause of action. As explained in Part II, students 
do have an argument that schools violate the Fourth Amendment 
when they conduct surveillance of their online and electronic activity. 
This potential constitutional claim, however, does not suffice as a 
vehicle for limiting schools’ surveillance authority and student privacy 
harms for at least three reasons. First, since the courts have not 
touched on whether this argument is valid, it is now just an 
argument. Second, that argument is not foolproof. A court would 
likely apply Acton as precedent for determining the reasonableness of 
broad school surveillance of student online and electronic activity 
instead of T.L.O., since school surveillance is more like the 
suspicionless drug testing in Acton than it is the suspicion-based 
search in T.L.O. However, under the Acton standard, the school 
would have a decent argument that the surveillance is reasonable. 
While not as limited a search as the drug testing in Acton, the 
argument exists that school surveillance does respond to a strong need 
for school intervention and discipline in order to combat 
cyberbullying, much like the searches in Acton. Finally, the Fourth 
Amendment protects against intrusions when a legitimate expectation 
of privacy exists and has thus far tended to address injuries, like the 
use of unlawfully obtained evidence in prosecutions, or the denial of 
participation in a school activity.268 It has not protected against “mere 
surveillance,”269 suggesting there may be no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in students’ online posts.270  
Similarly, students also have limited recourse when making 
privacy claims in tort. School officials have substantial immunity 
against privacy and other tort claims.271 Therefore, for all these 
 
268. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 US 325, 341 (1985) (student subjected to delin-
quency proceedings after marijuana-dealing supplies found in her purse); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (discussing how 
student was “denied participation in his school’s football program when 
he . . . refused to consent to [drug] testing”). 
269. Richards, supra note 19, at 1934; Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. 
Ct. 1138 (2013). 
270. See supra Part II.B.2.  
271. Weber, supra note 244. 
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reasons, a cause of action under cyberbullying laws offers a clear way 
to provide students with needed means of recourse for overly broad 
surveillance and privacy harms.  
A second criticism of the call for a statutory or regulatory cause 
of action is that because the cyberbullying laws will have to be 
amended to include these changes, the process will be slow or may not 
happen at all. Amending statutes and regulations is no small matter, 
politically or procedurally. However, the rapidity with which states 
have enacted these laws gives reason to think they could be amended 
just as quickly.272 Admittedly, state legislators may be far less likely 
to rapidly enact ways to sue schools, but that does not make the 
solution in the form of the cause of action less necessary. When the 
stakes—students’ privacy rights—are so high, the solutions that 
would offer real protection should be crafted regardless of the 
procedural difficulties. 
It is worth stating here too that in addition to not providing any 
mechanism for redress for students, the cyberbullying statutes do 
little, or nothing in most cases, to address the root causes of 
cyberbullying: bullying more generally or its effects on victims. They 
are simply disciplinary statutes,273 and most typically that discipline 
comes in the blunt forms of either suspension or expulsion.274 
Although this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, these failures 
in the cyberbullying laws are worth at least identifying alongside their 
other failures.  
V. Conclusion 
Students need protection from cyberbullying, and schools are an 
obvious place to turn for providing at least some of that protection. 
Schools have students in their custody for six or more hours a day for 
the majority of the year, and cyberbullying often occurs among 
 
272. Most cyberbullying statutes and regulations have been enacted since 
2008. See Thomas & Murphy, supra note 2. Admittedly, states may not 
work as quickly to enact laws giving students a way to sue schools. 
However, the ability to quickly enact laws to protect students, which is 
what the quickly enacted cyberbullying laws represent, exists. Thus, the 
capacity exists to quickly amend those laws to include causes of action 
that would serve to better protect students.  
273. For example, Indiana’s bullying statute is part of its school disciplinary 
code. Ind. Code § 20-33-8-0.2 (2007). Utah’s bullying statute calls for 
the suspension or expulsion of students for “behavior or threatened 
behavior which poses an immediate and significant threat to the welfare, 
safety, or morals of other students or school personnel or to the 
operation of the school.” Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-904(1)(c) 
(LexisNexis 2013). 
274. Ind. Code § 20-33-8-0.2 (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-904(1)(c) 
(LexisNexis 2013). 
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students.275 In examining the cyberbullying laws across the states, this 
Article has identified the problematic ways these statutes have sought 
to provide that protection by calling attention to the unprecedented 
expansion of school authority embodied in those laws. The laws 
expand school authority in a majority of states so far beyond the 
traditional schoolhouse gates that anywhere and everywhere is 
arguably “in school.” As well intentioned as the laws may be and as 
necessary as a response to cyberbullying is, the laws also implicate 
privacy harms for student that are made more acute because of 
schools’ authority over students. The laws, therefore, need to be 
reworked. A nexus framework that is subject to Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness requirements—linking school surveillance authority to 
when students are at school or school-related activities—needs to be 
imposed on the laws. Also, the laws need to provide students more 
agency in the form of a cause of action so they can seek redress when 
schools exceed their authority and impose privacy harms. Then the 
laws will better work to protect students, place meaningful limits on 
school authority, and prevent privacy harms on students. 
 
275. See supra notes 6, 211, and accompanying text.  
